BEACONS / Beacons

The situation has deteriorated seriously in recent days, to the point that objectively, one might consider that war is now likely, possibly in the very near future. This article will firstly examine the reasons for this observation, then the behaviour of the West, followed by possible aggression scenarios and finally, will likely response of the leaders of the European Union.

There are at least six reasons for the high probability of conflict.

• (1) The considerable military resources that Russia has been gradually sending to its border with Ukraine since November: some 130,000 troops and meaningful amounts of heavy materials (trucks, tanks, artillery, missile launchers, etc.). Recently, however, field hospitals have been set up: there would be no need for them if it were just training exercises.
• (2) The total osmosis between Russia and Belarus. The latter has a 50,000-strong army, plus border guards and reservists, but also, more recently, thousands of Russian soldiers. Joint military exercises have been held near to the Belarusian border with Ukraine. This synergy, together with manoeuvres of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea, effectively has Ukraine surrounded.
• (3) Claiming land in the name of a history that has become sanctified, of ‘Lebensraum’ or excessive nationalism, distorts judgment and brings nothing good. According to the beliefs of the Russian leaders, chiefly Putin, an independent Ukraine is an anomaly: centuries of integration with the Empire, then the USSR, are proof of this. In their minds, Kiev is making matters even worse by moving closer towards the European Union, with a highly detailed association agreement signed in 2014. It is now making things worse still, with its current government inclined to join NATO, a move that has the support of much of the population.
• (4) Ukraine’s geographical location and relative military weakness. Rather than being in the centre of the country, its capital is closer to Belarus and Russia than to its friends: Kiev is just 230 km from the border with Belarus. Ukraine is not a member of any alliance that would come to its immediate assistance in the event of attack. Its land army, certainly, consists of 150,000 well-trained and highly motivated soldiers. It has modernised and has had the benefit of Western military advice. Reinforcements in terms of materials (anti-tank missiles, drones) have come from the United Kingdom, the Baltic states and even Turkey. On the downside, its 247 aircraft are getting on a bit and its fleet consists of just a handful of vessels. Since the conflict in Donbass broke out eight years ago, the Ukrainian authorities have had to move much of the country’s military potential to that area and it cannot afford to leave that front weak. The Ukrainians enjoy a reputation as courageous fighters, but even they would have to climb down against the world’s second-largest military power, unless serious reinforcements were very quickly forthcoming.
• (5) The breakdown of diplomatic efforts. Moscow’s decision to withdraw its own diplomats from their positions in Kiev symbolises the end of the diplomatic sequence. Countless meetings and telephone conversations have taken place over the last weeks. The correspondence initiated by the Russian foreign affairs minister, on the principle of ‘equal and indivisible security’ (see EUROPE 12882/13), has simply had the effect of widening the gulf. Lavrov turned to several Western states, hoping for individual responses, but received just two letters, one from the Secretary General of NATO, the other from the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Lavrov responded with accusations of diplomatic rudeness, disrespect, lack of substance (see EUROPE 12889/9). The lengthy discussions between Macron and Putin on 7 February seemed, on the face of it, to pour a certain amount of oil on troubled waters. This was not in fact the case; even less so following the hour-long telephone conversation last Saturday between the American and Russian Presidents. The next day, the German President declared Moscow to be responsible for the crisis. While the alarm has been sounded in Washington and other capitals over the increase in the risk of war, one word invariably makes an appearance in the Kremlin’s narrative: hysteria. I refer readers to the dictionary and to Freud to take the full measure of this insult: you cannot negotiate with a hysterical person.
• (6) Finally, the indifference of the senior Russian leadership to the prospect of economic sanctions. The threat of retaliatory measures on a large scale has had no effect. It has been met with sneers or even outright obscenity, as in the case of the Russian Ambassador to Sweden: “Russia doesn’t give a shit about your sanctions!” It is impossible to deny that the sanctions already handed down to Russia and, more recently, in a number of tranches, to Belarus, have failed to destabilise their regimes.

In response to the crisis, the West has adopted intellectually coherent behaviour: standing firm, whilst remaining open to dialogue. However, they do not seem to have properly gauged the full depth of Russian resentment towards them, for the following reason: a sort of disdain for the loser in the great East-West confrontation starting in the 1990s, consolidated by a rapid expansion of NATO and a lack of reflection and procedure to involve the Russian Federation in the architecture of the new Europe. They – quite rightly – call for the OSCE to be the framework for a kind of negotiated reform, but it is almost certainly too late for that. They cling to the ‘Normandy’ format (Ukraine, Russia, Germany, France) in the hope of finding a lasting solution to the Donbass conflict, including the hoped-for de-escalation. In the middle of last decade, the format unquestionably achieved a precarious cessation of hostilities, but taken more broadly, it has been a failure: the meeting of 10 February at the level of political advisers was a clear demonstration of this: “no result”, the Kremlin announced. What should our expectations be of the meeting scheduled for March? 

Increasingly concerned at the turn of events, many countries, in the West and elsewhere, have ordered their nationals out of Ukraine. The airline KLM has already cancelled all its flights to Kiev and other airlines will surely follow suit. The United States, then Canada, have withdrawn their soldiers carrying out advisory missions on the ground. Furthermore, President Biden decreed the deployment of 3000 soldiers to Poland and Romania. The aim is to reassure the neighbourhood in general, not to fight in Ukraine. Following the disaster of Afghanistan, American public opinion would not back military intervention in the country. What’s more, it would mark the start of WW3. 

All these decisions made as a matter of urgency as well as the proliferation of alarmist declarations have not gone down well with the Ukrainian leaders, as they discourage investment. The same leaders have adopted an official discourse of appeasement, while apprehension is beginning to take hold of the population. At the insistence of President Zelensky, the diplomatic approach remains current. Chancellor Scholz, who has left on a visit to Kiev and then Moscow, should continue to believe in it. 

Let us now turn to possible elements of this probable warfare scenario. It could be triggered by the artificial expression of a call for help in the great Russian tradition: Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Afghanistan (1979, Crimea (2014), Kazakhstan (2022). In this case, the call would come from Russian speakers and pro-Russians in Donbass, claiming to be persecuted by the Ukrainian regime. This will be prompted by Moscow, which would respond by recognising the independence of the Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. There will be a series of cyber-attacks. President Zelensky will then be called upon to step down, for instance over his publicly expressed wish to take the country into the EU and NATO. When he refuses, military operations may begin: bombardment of strategic targets, neutralising the Navy, entry of land troops via Belarus and Russia to seize Kiev before it can draw breath. 

Now let us discuss the likely role of the European Union. At its most recent meeting on 16 December 2021, the European Council devoted 23 and 24 of its Conclusions to Ukraine (see EUROPE 12855/3). At the time, there were ‘just’ 70,000 Russian soldiers on the other side of the Ukrainian border. The European Council stressed the “urgent need for Russia to de-escalate tensions caused by the military build-up along its border with Ukraine and aggressive rhetoric”. It reiterated its “full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any further military aggression against Ukraine will have massive consequences and severe cost in response, including restrictive measures coordinated with partners”. Finally, it “encourages diplomatic efforts and supports the Normandy format in achieving the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements”.

Theoretically, the next meeting of the European Council is scheduled to be held on 24 March; it will have been preceded, on the 10th and 11th of the same month, by an informal meeting in France. But in breaking news, the Lithuanian President called for the institution to meet this week to discuss a coordinated response to Russian aggression. Watch this space …

For her part, the President of the European Commission has already announced that the package of sanctions is ready to go (see EUROPE 12884/16). It aims to hurt the Russian economy, particularly in its energy and technology dimensions.

At the moment, there is a united front, not just among the Twenty-Seven, but between the European Union and the United States as well. The dialogue is now well oiled. Should the Ukrainian authorities send out an SOS to the West with a view to securing military intervention, the collaboration would certainly come very quickly, but the result is hard to call. For instance, in the absence of a positive NATO decision, would certain EU countries head off into battle?

Finally, if the Russians took control of Ukraine via a government imposed by Moscow, many Ukrainians would most certainly try to flee the country. They would therefore go to their direct neighbours: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, even though most of those are renowned for their xenophobia. What kind of welcome would await this new type of migrant in these countries of first entry?

All the above is mostly speculation. But it would help the Europeans no end if they could show that when up against such an extremely talented and cynical chess player, they know a few moves too.

Renaud Denuit