On Tuesday 16 July, the MEPs elected a woman – German Christian Democrat Ursula von der Leyen – to lead the European Commission, for the first time (see EUROPE 12297/1). She won by a majority of fewer than 10 votes, with 383 MEPs voting for her versus a required absolute majority of 374 votes.
As it was a secret vote, there is no way of knowing exactly how the hemicycle acted. The next President of the Commission may have been elected by a pro-European majority broadly made up of 180 Christian Democrats, 100 Liberals and 100 Social Democrats. This last group, the S&D, was the most divided. Although the SPD and CDU parties have governed Germany together for the last 15 years, the German Social Democrats have not forgiven Ms von der Leyen for being nominated in the framework of a broad inter-governmental agreement that was the nail in the coffin of the process of lead candidates ('Spitzenkandidaten'). For their part, the French Socialists feel that the Christian Democrat’s programme of work does not go far enough and that by scuppering her election, it may have been possible to secure greater and more specific commitments.
But there may have been more defections than anticipated within the ranks of the pro-European political groups. Did the Christian Democrats of the EPP and the Liberals of Renew Europe really remain as united as they publicly claimed? Ms von der Leyen might well owe her election to the votes of the Conservatives and various unaffiliated MEPs, such as the Italians of the Five Star Movement.
It was not because the former German Defence Minister failed to imbue her speech with a resonantly progressive touch. Genuine belief or political calculation? Probably a bit of both. Certainly, Ms von der Leyen gave the Social Democrats and Greens earnest guarantees concerning the fight against climate change and social initiatives. Never before has a President of the Commission dared to play the card of a carbon tax on the borders of the EU. Although in favour of a dedicated budget for the Eurozone with a stabilising function, the outgoing Commission never went so far as to present a European unemployment insurance system. Ms von der Leyen also pledged action to ensure that all full-time workers receive a minimum wage within the EU. She did not, however, go quite so far as to promise a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact to exclude investments that promote the ecological transition from the calculation of the public deficit, as called for by the S&D group.
There is nothing to say that these measures will be in place at the end of the term in office of the 'von der Leyen' Commission, but in five years’ time, stakeholders will at least be able to reproach either the Commission for not having taken action, or the Council of the EU and/or European Parliament for not having been in a strong enough position to make these promises flesh. How many key measures, such as reform of the European asylum system or harmonisation of corporate tax, remain firmly stuck in the European legislative pipeline, in many cases due to the inability of the member states to agree?
The fact remains that the Parliament missed a unique opportunity to make its voice heard in the selection of the individuals who will be responsible moving forward the European integration project over the next five years. To avoid being presented with a fait accompli, the MEPs should have been proactive and presented a political project for the coming five years, identifying an individual with a political majority who would be capable of bringing this project to fruition. And they should have done so before the laborious three-day European summit that culminated with the unanimous nomination of Ms von der Leyen by 28 member states, less Germany’s abstention (see EUROPE 12287/1).
As was also the case in 2014, the MEPs fought tooth and nail to defend the principle of the Spitzenkandidaten, which was devised to personify the race to the Presidency of the Commission within the European election campaigns. However, as was not the case in 2014, when Jean-Claude Juncker won the proactive support of the MEPs owing to the backing of the Social Democrats under the leadership of Martin Schulz, they did not say who their Spitzenkandidat was, as every pro-European group stuck to its own position and defended its own champion. In response to which, the Twenty-Eight pointed out that there was no majority at the EP in favour of any of the Spitzenkandidaten.
As for the strategic agenda, this innovative idea, which aims to add to the strategic agenda of the European Council (see EUROPE 12279/1), the MEPs have begun work on a detailed roadmap. Five working groups were to present specific measures on environmental, economic and social issues, the fundamental values and Europe’s place in the world. Ultimately, four groups failed to do so because the interests behind their involvement so differed. And from what their leaders say, the chances of relaunching these talks are slim.
Time will tell whether the scanty support of the EP for Ms von der Leyen will get the President elect off to a bad start and is likely to undermine her scope for action over time. In October, a vote on the College as a whole will show whether the MEPs are any more supporting of the 'von der Leyen' Commission. Without beneficial cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament, there is next to no chance of moving the Council forward. Time might also tell whether this election is symptomatic of a fragmented Parliament in which a pro-European majority has become harder to pull together.
Mathieu Bion