First time for the EU. For the first time, an EU member state has decided on its own initiative to engage in a military operation, and other member states have supported it. Of course, the intervention is not arbitrary - it is based in particular on the positions and decisions of the UN, NATO and the EU itself, which make it legitimate. Yet the decision to act was taken in Paris, defining the limits and nature of the French intervention, and the EU as such then joined it. The previous edition of EUROPE covered the debate at the European Parliament and the statements and basic information from Mrs Ashton. Elsewhere, numerous positions and commentaries throughout world often express the opinion of one or other tendency and are linked to daily developments.
For my part, I'd like to try and place the events in a wider framework - from a historical as well as a geographical point of view - given the repercussions on the future of Europe and its relations with the Arab world and a large part of Africa.
Historical reminder of Arab importance. In the current circumstances, it would be desirable for the Arab world - the countries of the Maghreb in particular - to express clear and explicit majority positions with regard to its relationship with Europe, which implies that it should clarify its attitude with regard to freedom and democracy - an old request that has not always received clear answers everywhere. In the current circumstances, their attitude with regard to AQIM (Al-Quaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and their allies could have a determining significance. Do the countries of the Maghreb consider AQIM as the worst enemy of their glorious civilisation? Yes, I say glorious, because for several centuries it was far superior to European civilisation, which had forgotten the grandeur of its past - it was the Arabs who rediscovered it and renewed it.
A historian specialising in the period around the year one thousand wrote that the Arabs had saved in this period “an immense heritage of forgotten knowledge - Greek philosophy and geometry, Indian mathematics, Babylonian and Egyptian astronomy”. And they brought their contribution - still today, European children call the figures they learn at school Arabic numerals - the numerals that have made the discoveries of modern mathematics possible.
Fanatical, freedom-destroying Muslims today are not worthy of this past that they are totally unaware of - to the point of hating it and destroying its traces. Since taking possession of Timbuktu, their aversion for the true Muslim civilisation has exploded and their savagery and cruelty have gone beyond the imaginable (for example, they have cut the hand off a teenager in front of his father for a trivial issue). Yet I would prefer to leave the word to Tahar Ben Jelloun: “Democratic principles give priority to the law and to rights. But how can justice confront so much fanaticism? We are faced with criminals that nothing can stop except a force as brutal as their stupidity”. He recalled that sharia (also adopted by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf countries) includes, for example, the stoning of adulterous women, the removal of hands for thieves, and public execution for apostates. This is the doctrine currently applied by AQIM and its allies.
Support and puzzlement. Ben Jalloun brings us then to the Paris decision to attack north Mali, a territory bigger than France, which includes Timbuktu, with its mausoleums and its manuscripts. I have carefully read both the reasons that explain and justify the French operation and those that are against or reluctant about it. I needed to do this to have an overview.
(1) Arguments in favour. The operation is authorised by the UN; it is supported by all the states of West Africa and the legitimate authorities in Mali have called for it; it is the response to an attack that has come very largely from outside, because among the occupants of north Mali there are as many foreigners as Malians; France is not in principle committing troops on the ground, but exclusively aviation; African troops are due to replace the French armed forces as quickly as possible; the fact in itself of preventing a Jihadist centre in the Sahel is in the interest of the whole of Europe.
(2) Arguments that are against or reluctant. Adversaries can easily describe the operation as neo-colonialist; it gives rise to the additional risks to French hostages in Mali or in the region; the experience of Afghanistan proves that we know when military interventions begin, but never when they will end; the reconstitution of a country which is in the midst of being undone rarely has a successful ending; the preparation of an African army for an intervention supported by the UN is terribly late and will be virtually non-existent for several months at least; France will have to manage the risk of attacks at home; the French authorities have expressed their amazement at the quality and number of arms that the occupants of the area have available.
Romano Prodi, the UN special envoy for issues of the Sahel, expressed a certain amount of surprise at the French initiative - “The reasons for a surprise attack cannot be understood when negotiations were under way” - before adding that it is well-known that nearly all the weapons from Gaddafi's Libya - very modern weapons - have been routed to Mali and around.
Positive political situation… Romano Prodi's statement shows that puzzlement exists. Mrs Ashton's explanations to the European Parliament, while being clever and sincere, were not able to remove all the question marks. The difficulties are neither legal nor political, but on the ground.
Politically, everything seems clear. The UN Security Council has observed that the French operation comes within international legality. France has taken shelter behind Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which provides for “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” in case of armed attack against one of its member states. Legitimate Mali has been attacked, much of it occupied, and Malian President Traoré had explicitly called for French military aid. Neither Russia (which is fighting against Islamist extremism in part of its territory) nor China (the investments of which in Africa require the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states) have come up with any objection.
… but questioning on the ground. Everything seems to point on the ground to the action of France having to be prolonged and its military forces increased, and to the participation of other states having to be consolidated and enlarged for the operation to be effective. It is planned that 400 to 500 European military should take care of training the Malian army in the field, without the Europeans participating in the fighting, and that an international support force for Mali (MISMA) should act in liaison with the armed forces of Mali; but none of this exists yet, and the most optimistic believe that these projects will still take several more months. Moreover, a NATO spokesperson has stated that “until now the operation in Mali is a national operation decided upon by the French government, without NATO involvement”.
The American authorities, on their side, would be ready to supply transport and refuelling planes, as well as spy planes, but ruling out the possibility of being engaged any further while congratulating France on its initiative. As could have been predicted, several observers have developed learned comparisons with the birth and unfurling of the conflict in Afghanistan, and the American intention of remaining on the sidelines is easy to understand.
While visiting Dubai, French President François Hollande stated (as quoted by the national press): “France does not have authority to stay in Mali, but we have an objective - to bring it about that when we leave there will be safety in Mali, legitimate authorities, an electoral process and no terrorists”. It's an ambitious programme then, which will not be easy to bring about.
Reason and objectives for the effort. Why have I given so much space and attention to this issue? Because it will have important repercussions in several areas - the EU's relationship with the countries of the Maghreb and with a large part of Africa; because it confirms that a European policy in the military domain does not exist; because it enables the intentions of the Maghreb countries and the attitude of the Arabs living in Europe to be probed and better understood. All this requires the objectives and hopes, but also the difficulties and uncertainties, to be scrutinised. (FR/transl.fl)