The theory and the reality. So what exactly is the European Parliament waiting for, to give up on the fiction of Turkish accession to the EU? It continues to vote on resolutions based on this hypothesis, whereas the responsible authorities on both sides know perfectly well that it has become a fairytale. Furthermore, in its most recent vote on the matter, the EP increased its requirements and reasons for its dissatisfaction (see EUROPE 10585). For its part, Turkey has increasingly shown attitudes bordering on provocation towards the EU. The accession negotiations, which in practice were shelved years ago, subsist in theory because nobody has yet managed to find the right way to halt them. It is in the interests of neither party to destroy what has been achieved, as economic relations have developed considerably. But at a political level, Turkey has never hesitated to take stances which are in many cases incompatible with European foreign policy.
There's no point in my going on about it, it would be too repetitive: this column has for years been stressing the historical, geographical, budgetary etc impossibility of Turkish accession. Last week, I highlighted Turkey's new importance, not simply economic and political, but also cultural, in the Arab world (see EUROPE 10582) and two days later, the first episode erupted of what would turn into a conflict between the Turkish government and the forthcoming Presidency of the Council of the EU, Cyprus (see EUROPE 10585). Turkey, as we know, does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus and, unless it can come to some agreement by the end of June, is refusing to accept this Republic as a discussion partner representing the EU.
Radiation and difficulties. This is a highly intricate situation, because it covers several facets: there is even undersea oil that Turkey and Cyprus are disputing! Turkey radiates outwards, its influence extends to the whole of what was formerly the Ottoman Empire; but this external radiation is always accompanied by deeply entrenched internal problems, whether they relate to the Kurds and other minorities, or the growing primacy of the religious element over secular principles; for example, the confusion caused by the reform of the educational system, which has just been voted on by the Ankara Parliament, allowing families to take their children out of secular schools after the elementary cycle to transfer them to religious schools. The problems of press freedom and the reform of justice are also often mentioned.
For its part, Ankara is making its requirements of the EU, for example by establishing a link between, on the one hand, the application of the agreement for the readmission into Turkey of illegal immigrants entering the EU across the border between Greece and Turkey and on the other, the removal of the EU's visa requirement on the access of Turkish citizens to Community territory.
As we can see, questions being discussed with Turkey do not point to the EU's relationship with an accession candidate country. This is a third country with specific links to the EU.
Tunisia, an example? From the list of Arab countries in which Turkey has a confirmed influence, Tunisia is a case apart because the head of the majority party has declared that sharia (Islamic law) will not be included in the new Constitution. In Tunisia, as in other countries of the region, the dominant party, named Ennahada, is Islamic and guides the government; but it has announced that it will be adopting, word for word, the first article of the 1959 Constitution, that of Habib Bourguiba, including, amongst other things, a woman's status which is the most progressive in the region, by a long way. Many women voted for this moderate Islamist party to affirm their faith, but with no intention of giving up on their conquests.
The radical Islamic Salafists exist in Turkey as they do elsewhere, and have stepped up their violence and provocation, even attacking women not wearing the veil. But an observer on the ground stressed that “this fanatical Islamism is profoundly foreign to the Tunisians, particularly Tunisian women”.
It is clear that the Arab populations who have won back their freedom and brought in democracy will choose their own regime for themselves; Europe has no right to impose its own model. The principles of the secular state and gender equality are by no means a reality everywhere; it is up to them to choose. The EU defines its relationship and its links with each of these countries, whose positions are not all the same and, in some cases, are even conflicting. The head of the Moroccan government told two European partners he had just received that “the Western Sahara is and will remain Moroccan, everybody needs to accept this”.
The EU must remain true to its responsibilities and desire for cooperation, but it must never forget that it also has its own principles and the interests of its own population to defend. (FR/transl.fl)