Euro countries are sticking to their treaty. How should one react to the different points of view regarding the future of European construction set out in this column yesterday? There is no one answer and it will take time to explain it all. However, in the case of the new treaty on budgetary discipline within the eurozone, time is running short. The member states concerned, and the Council, have confirmed the timeframe for finalising it, although the Parliament has rejected what it considers to be a pointless initiative. The EP is seeking to bring everything back within the Community framework, and that is quite understandable. How can one forget, however, that it was the United Kingdom that refused to take part in the treaty and that other member states also have not yet taken a very clear stance on the matter? If the treaty does not come within the EU framework, then what sort of treaty would it be? And to what extent does the Parliament truly believe that eurozone countries would be willing to give up their project?
A “democratic requirement”. Last month, when addressing the Senate, the French minister responsible for European affairs, Jean Leonetti, had described the treaty as a “democratic requirement”. Allow me to cite what he said: “A president elected by universal suffrage, who commits himself on behalf of France, carries more weight than a decision by the European Commission”. After pointing out that “earlier provisions, under whatever form when adopted, have all been violated”, he underlined that, in the event of non-compliance with the new rules, sanctions will be automatic. From the legal point of view, Leonetti challenged the fact that an agreement taken by 26 could not commit institutions to which 27 belong, recalling that “there are precedents” for this and that the Lisbon Treaty has provided for those states that so wish to “be entitled to go further, while respecting the 27-member treaty”, while not forgetting that the “Schengen system, before it became a Community system, was an international treaty”.
Leonetti had added three comments: (a) in order to take part in the treaty envisaged, the United Kingdom asked to be entitled to oppose new rules that might result from it, when it is “unacceptable to bring in rules everywhere, except for the City”; (b) provisions on rating agencies may be adopted by qualified majority; and (c) it is possible there will be problems when it comes to ratifying the new treaty, but it will take effect as soon as the number of ratifications has exceeded a number below that of eurozone countries. He had gone on to conclude by saying: “At the end of the day, there might only be 26 of us but it will not be dramatic.”
Other governments may not fully share the explicit view of France, but there are enough member states that will ratify the new treaty in good time, so that eurozone autonomy becomes rapidly effective. National parliaments will necessarily play a management role, as the financing of eurozone instruments will be guaranteed by member states' budgets. This role, moreover, is already acknowledged (Angela Merkel informing the national parliament before any negotiation takes place in Brussels). A considerable number of MEPs (but not all) are aware of the need to cooperate with their national colleagues. However, at the same time, the most attentive and inventive members seek to prevent euro management being separated from the Community framework. Guy Verhofstadt has underlined the need for the whole content of the new treaty to be incorporated into the EU Treaty within five years at the very most.
Is a two-speed Europe feasible? To sum up the situation, I often use the two-speed Europe formula in order to safeguard the possibility that a member state, which chooses not to take part initially in a number of Community schemes, may be able to join the others at a later date. According to Jean-Guy Giraud, President of the Union des fédéralistes européens France, “it is illusory to imagine that one can form within the EU two stable but porous groups, the first taking the road of political integration and the second reserving the right to join later if it so wishes”. He considers that this concept would lead “not to 2 but to 4 or 5 speeds, causing several sub-entities to crystallise: the Central States of Europe, Scandinavian and Baltic States, Mediterranean States, Balkan States, etc.”. Only the United Kingdom can recommend such a development in which nothing resembling the true European construction would remain. Giraud considers that the only way to overcome the current difficulties and divergence is to review the treaty, to be prepared by a Convention at the initiative of the European Parliament (a solution that he recommends and has been mulling over for some time). Such a stance is encouraging, as it shows that there is still confidence in an ever more united Europe. (FR/transl.jl)