Brussels, 07/06/2011 (Agence Europe) - In its rulings handed down in Cases T-217/06 and T-206/06, the EU General Court has refused to overturn the Commission decision of May 2006 which found against Arkema SA (now Arkema France) and its subsidiaries - Altuglas International SA and Altumax Europe SAS - and also their parent companies at the time - Total SA and Elf Aquitaine SA (from May 2000) - for their participation in a cartel in the methacrylates sector (commonly known as acrylic glass) from 23 January 1997 to 12 September 2002 (see EUROPE 9202).
The Court did, however, reduce the €219.1 million fine imposed on Arkema and its subsidiaries to €113.3 million, deciding that the increase of 200%, calculated on the basis of parent company Total's sizeable turnover figures in order to act as a deterrent, was excessive. Since the economic unit which linked Arkema to Total had been broken before the date on which the decision was adopted, the latter company's resources could not be taken into account in determining the increase in the fine imposed on Arkema and its subsidiaries. The Court decided that a 25% increase was adequate.
The Court, however, upheld the responsibility of the parent companies at the time - Elf Aquitaine SA then Total SA (from May 2000, when it took control from Elf) - in the infringement and confirmed the fines imposed by the Commission of €181.35 million and €140.4 million respectively, taking the view that a subsidiary, the share capital of which is wholly owned or almost (in this case 96% owned) by its parent company, does not independently decide its conduct on the market. In line with established case-law, the Commission was correct in imposing these fines without it being required that their direct involvement in the infringement had to be established, unless they could supply sufficient proof that Arkema had acted independently.
The Court rejected the request from the two companies for reduction of their fines as they had recently had other substantial pecuniary penalties imposed on them because of their participation in other cartels. This would lead to the paradoxical situation where a company could become involved in increasing numbers of cartels yet see the cost of each fine diminish progressively, which would clearly be contrary to the objective of deterrence pursued by the fines. (F.G./transl.rt)