Readers, on guard! In his recent look at the current state of European construction (EUROPE 10309), Jacques Delors expressed some different positions from those supported by this column on a number of significant points. I consider that it is both appropriate and justified for me to point these differences out to the reader because this column has always considered Jacques Delors as a model without equal, and obviously this position remains the same. The differences mainly focus on two aspects:
a) Turkish accession. An official summary of Jacques Delors' position points out that “Turkish accession seems to him to be the best way of proving wrong the proponents of the clash of civilisations theory. Negotiations would also help resolve the Cypriot issue: it would be shameful for the United Nations to have to tackle this matter. We should not say no before having genuine negotiations”.
Our loyal readers know that this column considers that Turkish accession should not be the ultimate goal for a number of different reasons: geographical (most of Turkish territory is in Asia); political (Turkey is assuming national foreign policy positions that are increasingly more differentiated and which, in my opinion, make European efforts impossible to gradually create an EU foreign policy); institutional (Turkey's punching power would be greater than that of other member states insofar that it would have the most votes at the Council and the greatest number of MEPs, and this trend would be likely to increase further); and budgetary: an increasing amount of common agricultural policy and cohesion funds would go to Turkey.
I have to ask myself whether the current and main beneficiaries of these two policies have thought this issue through sufficiently. EUROPE 10306 highlighted the support Warsaw received from different Community funds. Is the Polish government aware that there would not be much of this funding left over if Turkey joins the EU? In short, Turkish accession would, in my opinion, only be possible if the EU abandoned the majority of its political goals. It is significant that the European Parliament's “political affairs” committee (EUROPE 10313) even discussed the possibility of proposing a “privileged partnership” to Ankara, even if this hypothesis has been definitively (for the time being?) withdrawn.
Jacques Delors' position underpins a global strategic outline, which I am unable to fathom.
b) Institutional slippage. Following the official summary of his position, Jacques Delors expressed, “regret that the right of initiative now goes to Herman Van Rompuy and the European Parliament, whilst the Commission is reduced to playing the role of expert, which does not suit it and which it carries out quite badly. He acknowledges Mr Van Rompuy's genuine savoir-faire but denounces the invisible role of orchestra conductor, conferred upon him by the Lisbon Treaty”.
This observation is, for the most part, irrefutable and it is logical that someone who has been president of the Commission and who has influenced the course of history should make it. During his first mandate, Mr Barroso did not hide the fact that he sought to sound out the member states before launching important initiatives and did not wish to begin projects that had no chance of being completed. By adopting this approach, he considered that his exclusive right of initiative was not being compromised. The Lisbon Treaty has, moreover, reshuffled the deck of cards. The heads of government who only tackled Community affairs periodically (and in several cases, without having sufficient knowledge of them), have become the driving force of Europe. If the permanent president requests the European Council to grant him a task, which would have previously been conferred upon the Commission, what is the latter able to do about it? It is then called upon to draw up draft texts, a task in which its role is irreplaceable. The different dimensions of change had not been foreseen by the authors of the Lisbon Treaty. Everything has changed and this column will be returning to this issue and its ramifications.
Clarification. I would also like to add that that the position taken by Jacques Delors clarifies questions to which this column previously did not have any answers. Faced with the decision of the eurozone countries to give a purely intergovernmental character to the European Financial Stability Funds, he calls for the enhanced cooperation instrument to be used. This is explicitly provided for by the Treaty and without it Europe would neither have had the Schengen agreements nor the euro. On the controversial issue of eurobonds, he is “in favour of Europe taking out loans for investment and not for paying the debts of the past”.
We are able to see to what extent Jacques Delors' position is so valuable. This column should, in my opinion, point out that on these two aspects it has a different position - of which, our readers are not unaware.
(F.R./transl.fl)