Bilateral preference. The EU-Russia summit at the beginning of the month confirms that although mutual relations are becoming stronger, they are still on the margins of the Community institutions' trajectory. This situation is partly the result of Moscow's preference for bilateral relations with heads of state and government from the main EU countries, but the latter also give the impression that they prefer bilateral meetings with Vladimir Putin or Dimitri Medvedev too. It is true that in 2008 Nicolas Sarkozy, at the time of the tragic war in Georgia, respected Community principles by explicitly taking action as president of the European Council and demanding that the president of the European Commission attend the signing of the formal agreements. Nonetheless, it was purely by chance that these events took place at the time of the French Presidency and it should be admitted that no other acting president would have taken such swift decisions or displayed the necessary dynamism to help resolve the situation and obtain a freeze in the conflict. It should also be said that Moscow would not have accepted as negotiating partner a president of the European Council from a small member state.
Could the fact that there is now a permanent president of the European Council change the situation? This is both possible and desirable but it should not yet be assumed that this is the case. How this situation develops depends, above all, on the EU itself. Visibility is an obvious aspect: certain heads of government are not prepared to give up their bilateral meetings, given the resonance that these meetings generate. This aspect, however, also exists in other cases, such as with the US, as a prime example, but this should not underestimate the importance and clamour that Community meetings create. The real problem lies elsewhere and can be located in the fact that in the key sector, energy, the major member states prioritise their own national interests, which do not always coincide. In other areas, the EU has to speak with a single voice and can only negotiate as a whole, with trade policy being the most obvious example in this connection. In the energy arena, however, European policy does not exist and the instruments to create it are not yet clear or explicit enough - it is not simply by chance that Jacques Delors launched the project for a European Energy Community, beginning with specific strengthened cooperation.
What counts can be found in the sideshow. In the meantime, the power of EU action as such, is very limited. We are aware of the rule of the permanent president of the European Council: never express personal positions, only positions that have duly been established in common. And if these do not exist … The Commission has, in principle, a broad range of autonomy but not for energy. At a more general level, new European foreign policy instruments are in the preparation phase or currently being broken in. This is why the Rostov summit was devoid of any real substance and failed to have any significant resonance. The results go no further than a few orientations confirming what was already known and a few texts of remarkable banality, such as the Partnership for Modernisation, with very limited scope, and the agreement on the Protection of Classified Information. There is nothing that can be to be added to the report in EUROPE 10150. The two genuinely important projects for EU-Russia relations, namely the new partnership agreement and the implementation (quite unrealistic for the moment) of the four common spaces, were not mentioned and let's not even talk about the energy dossier - on first impressions, no-one even mentioned it in Rostov.
The main protagonists were quite aware of this situation. For the Europeans, Mr Van Rompuy did not try to give the event any spin at all and in his address to the press, he only read out a text prepared in advance, which on just one point, included his own personal evaluation - great concern on the part of the EU with regard to the defence of human rights and journalists in Russia. Overall, only one divergence was given any recognition - Mr Medvedev wants very soon to see an end to visa requirements for citizens (he is ready to do it), whereas for Mr Van Rompuy and Mr Barroso this is a “long-term objective”.
Concerns in Russia? Russian concerns about the make up of the European delegation appeared obvious. Arkady Dvorkovitch, adviser to President Medvedev pointed out: “At least now we know who is responsible for what at the head of the EU. But we will continue our relations at different levels. Sarkozy, Merkel and the other heads of state are still there …” According to a Russian diplomat, “it is difficult to say whether the new European mechanism is efficient because it is not yet operational”.
It is clear to see, the general issue of EU foreign policy is framed in these terms. Tomorrow, this column will return to the Russian question and more general difficulties.
(F.R./transl.fl)