Legally tricky, politically clear. I am not in a position to comment on the German constitutional court's ruling on Germany's ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Lawyers' interpretations and comments diverge so widely - but I notice that they often accuse one another of missing the point. Media headlines focus on the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has been declared to be compatible with the German constitution, or sometimes on the fact that ratification is reported to have been blocked. Experts tell us that both statements are correct. The ruling allows Germany to ratify the Lisbon Treaty but introduces a precondition that the German government says it will be able to meet in the near future. In reality, the correct headline is that of our newsletter (issue 9932) - the ruling paves the way for ratification.
Apparently, Germany's constitutional court states in its ruling that the EU is not a federation. An einheitlich European people does not exist. Einheitlich is sometimes translated as “uniform” and sometimes as “homogenous”. The vacuum that has been noted means the powers of the German government need to be confirmed as it retains control over treaties and how they develop in order to ensure the people's sovereignty. The European Parliament does not have any powers in this connection. The political significance of this is unclear - some commentators argue that the Karlsruhe ruling highlights the EU's lack of democratic legitimacy; while others comment that the Karlsruhe ruling is an invitation to move beyond uncertainty and rapidly create a genuine European federation. Perhaps this is where the long-term significance of the ruling lies. It has, however, also been observed that by beefing up some powers of national parliaments in EU affairs, it is actually the Lisbon Treaty itself that introduces some of what the German court is calling for.
No further Lisbon Treaty delays. Legal analysis of the Karlsruhe ruling may continue for some time to come. What is important is that Germany's political leaders ensure that the conditions imposed by the court can be met by 18 September 2009. The German president, Horst Kuehler, could sign the treaty immediately after the ratification law (that has already been approved by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat). If the Irish referendum takes place in October 2009 and the Irish vote in favour of the Lisbon Treaty, then the Eurosceptic presidents of Poland and the Czech Republic will no longer be able to refuse to sign and the treaty could come into force.
The Czechs must decide. Commenting yesterday in this column on the new Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU, I did not mention the achievements of the outgoing Czech Presidency. I would like to say that I do not share the judgement of people who claim that the presidency was negative from start to finish. A number of Czech politicians genuinely deserve praise for the way they carried out their European work, some of them demonstrating immense ability and the capacity to mediate in tough debates and to draw up compromise details. Even the presidents of the EU Council who were called in at the last minute after the collapse of the government have achieved positive outcomes, including the Czech prime minister. What individual responsibilities could one attribute beforehand to the people forced to resign from the government? Especially when they were forced to cooperate with an openly Eurosceptic Czech president who threw a spanner in the works to prevent most of the measures that a president of the Council of the EU has to manage at European level?
The basic problem is a more general question - to what extent is it possible for a country whose top head of state directly opposes the EU's action and the legislation the EU is debating and preparing to actually chair the Council of the EU, a Council whose job it is to ensure success in the EU's action? Put this starkly, the question is misleading and I know that it raises problems that cannot be solved in practice. Nuances are required. Nevertheless, I do believe that is for the inhabitants of countries to decide on the fundamental issues, if not the details.
The Czech people must clearly indicate in a democratic vote whether they approve of their country's membership of the EU and whether they share the European integration objectives, or whether they would rather remain on the margins, which would be a perfectly valid and equally noble choice. Every country is free to make its own choices and accept the consequences thereof. The Czech Republic has good historic reasons to be sceptical about foreign control (after its sorry plight in the twentieth century at the hands of the Austrians, Germans and Russians). If the Czechs have not yet been convinced that the EU is a different kettle of fish entirely, then the European project will wait for it. But if a country decides to remain on the margins, the EU will have to look at precautions that will need to be taken to ensure it does not remain blocked. The problem has not arisen with Prague, but it does exist.
(F. R./transl.fl)