The results of the European Council of this Thursday and Friday are not, at first sight, likely to set the crowds on fire. The decision which would, a short time ago, have been considered the most spectacular piece of news (paving the way for a further Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty) no longer comes as a surprise, and the three most politically delicate issues were partly evaded. What was left was mainly declarations and orientations, some of them significant, but not really decisions in the strictest sense of the word.
The Irish dilemma is (almost) resolved. The legal guarantees which will allow the Irish government to hold its second referendum, thus rendering the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon possible, were greatly anticipated. However, over the months, the situation has moved on; surveys show that the voting intentions of the citizens of Ireland have become increasingly favourable to the ratification of this treaty, and the European political movement which told people of Ireland so many untruths to get them to reject it has been demolished by the voters, in Ireland and throughout the EU. These guarantees simply guarantee aspects of the Lisbon Treaty which should have been quite clear from the start, if the Irish citizens had been correctly informed - in other words, this treaty will in no way affect the military neutrality of the member states, or national legislation on abortion and divorce; it will not change the competencies of the EU and of the member states on taxation issues. Differences on the legal nature of these guarantees are a matter of concern only for the political decision-makers, not for the citizens. The second referendum will prove that Ireland is a "genuinely pro-European" country, as the Irish prime minister put it.
Some attention must be paid to the comments of Elmar Brok (see our bulletin 9909) on other obstacles hindering the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon with, at the top of the list, the potential threat represented by the British Conservatives who favour a national referendum, closely followed by the traps laid by the Czech president, Vaclav Klaus, to sabotage this treaty. It will soon be given to the Czech people to make their choice between euroscepticism and deepened European unity.
Three questions which remain open. The points which the European Council didn't really manage to resolve are:
1. EU-Russia relations and stability of supply of Russian gas coming via Ukraine. It was to be expected that the heads of government would avoid openly discussing the details of this dossier. This is a complicated business which involves the security of the energy supply of the EU and relations with Russia as a whole. I would like to refer anybody who is interested to this section of our bulletin 9921.
2. European surveillance of the behaviour of banks and other financial institutions. The summit gave its explicit approval to the outlines of the Commission's document, but declined to take position clearly on those elements in which differences of opinion have emerged in the Economy/Finance Council (see our bulletin 9923). The Commission is going to make its outlines into legislative drafts and will doubtless reaffirm its choices on the controversial issues. The accelerated timetable it provided (legislative texts ready by autumn, entry into force in 2010) was approved by the summit in principle. The absence of arbitration at the summit over the differences of opinion does nothing to undermine the political will to effect a rigorous reform of the world of finance; on the contrary, this was clearly confirmed.
3. Future presidency of the European Commission. The political support of the summit for keeping Mr Barroso in place is strong, but it does not have the legal nature of an appointment ("the person whom they plan to appoint"). Some heads of government and European political parties take the view that his formal appointment could be made next month, but the misgivings of the European Parliament regarding an accelerated procedure (meaning that it would be started under the Treaty of Nice, which is still in force) are considerable, and nobody wants to see a politico-legal conflict between the European Council and the EP. A proper debate prior to this within the new Parliament appears likely, therefore, and the result cannot be second-guessed, as there are so many elements (including alliances between political groups and the inevitable bargaining over the sharing of other European jobs, including the presidency of the EP itself) to be taken into account. Not only that, but similar bargaining is likely, or already underway, between the governments of the member states.
Having made these comments about the dossiers which were not put to bed by the heads of state and government, the following pages are full of the official results and, more importantly, the stances and explanations of the protagonists. (F.R./transl.fl)