Dialogue has not been interrupted. The imminent resumption of negotiations between the EU and Russia on the new partnership agreement will, in particular, relaunch discussions on energy cooperation (see this column yesterday). Dialogue on energy has never, in fact, been interrupted. The Georgian crisis, with its accompanying declarations and sometimes superficial and inopportune attitudes, threw a shadow upon this dialogue but the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC), a specific Euro-Russian body in this area, did actually meet on 8 October in Paris at a ministerial level (EUROPE 9758). The EU delegation, led by the president of the “Energy” Council and the European commissioner in charge of this sector, touched on all the different aspects of the situation, including the most sensitive issues: Russian oil field production capacities, investment projects that enable Russia to meet demand and commitments, equal treatment of European companies. The Russian delegation raised a question it is concerned about: Gazprom's presence on the European market and it being able to exercise the function of both producer and distributor. The official resumption of negotiations will mark the transition from information exchange to the definition of common rules and commitments.
EU is in strong position. In this perspective, it is essential that the EU speaks with a single voice. It is not just the European Commission and the overall majority at the European Parliament which says this, but also the executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Nobua Tanaka. Having pointed out that EU countries prefer to discuss things bilaterally with producer countries, Tanaka indicated that the EU market accounted for 70% of Russia's gas exports. The EU is therefore in a strong position; the question, according to Mr Tanaka, is how to use these negotiations. Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, openly regretted in a speech to the French Senate, “the bilateral agreements between certain member states and Russia”. He therefore highlighted the fact that “for the Russians, the main market is the European market. For the Russians, it is a safe and well known market, even if they can also sell Siberian oil to Asian countries. Russia brings us 25% of our gas but Norway provides us with 18% of it and Algeria 10%. The EU also has to look at the situation in each of the other potential suppliers, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Egypt”. The commissioner left Iran out, as he thought they should wait until the uranium enrichment dossier was settled.
The EU has not, in fact, forgotten the other suppliers. On 18 September, it arranged a meeting in Paris between the foreign affairs ministers of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kirghizstan as part of the EU/Central Asia Forum. The meeting was chaired by Bernard Kouchner, the acting president of the External Relations Council; Javier Solana and European Commissioner Benita Ferrero Waldner also attended, as well as the Turkish minister, Ali Babacan. This sent out a political message.
Gazprom on the European market. Mr Piebalgs believes that a crucial problem is “the risk of Gazprom creating a monopoly on gas production and distribution in Europe”. This question of Gazprom's double role has already been mentioned. In some member states it is already exercising the role of distributor to end-users. New rules on the completion of the European internal market will forbid EU operators from exercising this double role. The political agreement on the new legislative package for the liberalisation of the internal gas and electricity market, reached on 10 October at the Energy Council, includes a double-pronged compromise on implementing the unbundling of production and distribution activities (EUROPE 9759). Complicated provisions that came out of the tough discussions were defined by ministers in view of a second reading at the European Parliament and a lot of work went into the “third country clause”. I am not going to go over the history again here, about an issue of essential economic and political interest for the functioning and autonomy of the EU's energy policy. For that, I suggest readers consult the detailed articles provided by Emmanuel Hagry which are regularly published in our bulletin.
Gazprom's presence on the European market therefore represents one of the politically sensitive aspects of the next EU-Russia negotiations. It is an example of the internal and international political implications of these negotiations. This column will return to this issue tomorrow. (F.R./transl.rh)