Diplomatic error. Reservations on the part of some member states and a gaffe from Moscow prevented the EU from formally announcing the resumption of negotiations on a new partnership agreement with Russia. But sensitivities and caution cannot alter the fact: the negotiations will begin again shortly (see this column in newsletter No 9760). The Russian slip-up was in calling for South Ossetia and Abkhazia to be officially involved in the Geneva meeting organised by the UN, the EU and the OSCE to discuss the security and stability of their regions. Moscow alone has recognised their independence: how can it call for them to be admitted, by, among others, Georgia itself, to international negotiations as independent republics. A legal compromise would have been reasonable so that their representatives could be present at talks on their future: but there could be no more than that. Would Serbia and Russia take part in negotiations with the government of Kosovo? Trying to act in this way only leads to stiffening of stances. These differences over ways of working become secondary, however, given that the EU and Russia will once again soon start negotiating on the key point in their relations: energy.
Essential for Moscow. The interest in energy cooperation is shared, but for Russia it is even more essential than for the EU, according to the European negotiator on the new partnership agreement Eneko Landaburu. Europe would find any alternative costly and complicated, but there are alternatives. Moscow, however, has no alternatives in terms of either outlets or investment (see our newsletter No 9751). Studies carried out on the ground on exploitation of resources and transport infrastructure back up this opinion. Russia is still far from exhausting its resources, but its installations and extraction and transport technologies are outdated; gaps are huge and the time it takes to overcome them long. Gazprom has taken on commitments beyond its current production capacity, and its level of debt has exceeded the safety limit. Investment and technological input from Europe are both essential and urgently needed. Moscow is trying everything: cooperation agreements and supply contracts with the huge Western oil companies; bilateral political agreements with EU member states, especially those needed for the transit of gas; and recent willingness to become involved in European projects, even where they are looking to alternative routes.
The case of Nabucco. Let me give some further explanation. I perhaps overstated the case recently when writing about Russian willingness to become part of the Nabucco Project (see this column in newsletter 9760). What Russian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizov was saying, in fact, was that his country would be willing to use the Nabucco gas pipeline (which does not go through Russia), even for transporting Russian gas to the EU. That is important, because the problems currently being encountered by this project are not just related to financing and technology, but also to sources of supply. The scale of the project is such that, experts say, gas from Azerbaijan (where the pipeline starts) will never be enough to fully supply it. It will only become viable and be economically justified if it transports Russian, and, in time, Iranian, gas to the EU (with a direct link with Turkmenistan still dependent on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, a matter that has been pending since 1991). In conditions such as these, announcing to Brussels that it was prepared to supply Nabucco is a significant political gesture on the part of Russia. It is an opening: in place of unlimited competition between transport networks, there is cooperation with Turkey, the countries of Central Asia and especially the EU, the final destination.
One condition. The shift set out here has not been decided by Moscow out of love for its neighbour, but is born out of necessity. The Georgian crisis led to a flow of foreign capital out of Moscow. Certainly, oil revenue ensures a certain amount of room for manoeuvre for Moscow (even though the fall in the price of oil is reducing this wriggle room), but the need for investment and technology is colossal, and the effect long-term. The political effort by Moscow, for example, to ensure its access to Turkmenistan production, is not just a political objective - it is an economic and technical imperative.
Analysis of the situation must not lead the EU to try to blackmail Russia, but to make it aware of the strength of its negotiating position. The EU is not in the position of having to beg, and must not hesitate to set out its demands - on condition that it speaks with one voice. Member states have to understand this. This column will return to this and a number of other points tomorrow.
(F.R./transl.rt)