My commentary, yesterday, on Monday's Extraordinary European Council was not an exhaustive one; far from it. A few additional considerations are called for.
1. Georgia has chosen Europe. The demonstration in Tbilissi held in parallel to the summit in Brussels of the EU was impressive; televised reports and eyewitness accounts of special envoys on the ground proved this eloquently. A human chain 5 km long; writers, singers, artists, all mixing with the anonymous crowd; a million participants in a city of 2 million inhabitants; similar demonstrations throughout the country. All of this spoke of the pride of a people who wish to remain free and who feel European. The EU must stand alongside them, it has voiced its intentions of doing so and will do so, from all points of view: solidarity will be made reality and ties will be tightened.
But this commitment of the people of Georgia to their identity and their desire to decide for themselves on their own future must lead the country also to understand the similar aspirations of populations, just a few dozen kilometres away, who were celebrating their autonomy and the arrival of the Russian marines. It will take a great deal of balance and serenity from all sides if sustainable and fair solutions are to be defined and applied.
2. Russia must be consistent. The above considerations must also be understood in Moscow. You cannot apply, in some circumstances, the principal of the autonomy of the people in choosing their own status, whilst rejecting it in others, be it Chechnya or Ingushetia. The summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (the SCO referred to in yesterday's column), which is made up of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, has confirmed its support of efforts to preserve the unity of the states and their territorial integrity. It is not easy to reconcile respecting the wishes of the people with respecting official borders, as Europe's own experience has shown. But a minimum level of consistency is required, in order to remain credible.
3. NATO must not be an instrument of the division of Europe. Georgia and Ukraine's ambition to join NATO is understandable, but NATO must not once again become a curtain separating Europe, as it did at the time of the Cold War. The creation, in 2002, of the NATO-Russia Council had got past that stage, with a view to organising the global security of the European continent. Monday's European Council did not call this partnership with Russia into question, although some tendencies in this direction appeared; the objective of dialogue remains unchanged. For its part, Russia has scrupulously avoided suspending its indirect cooperation with NATO in Afghanistan and has confirmed the cooperation agreement with the EU on refugees from Darfur (the deployment of troops and helicopters in Chad and the Central African Republic). These achievements must be safeguarded, in anticipation of genuine cooperation (which, incidentally, already exists in a number of areas, for example regarding the Iranian nuclear programme). The Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergeï Lavrov, has relaunched the idea of getting all parties together to discuss a fair system of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area.
4. Certain aspects of the European Council's decisions need to be clarified. A few paragraphs of the Conclusions of Monday's European summit state intentions which require clarification. The first of these concerns the presence on the ground (paragraph 5 of the Conclusions). The dispatch of an autonomous EU mission (supported, it would seem, by Mr Solana) has been prepared for, for the time being, by an exploratory mission, albeit with the commitment to make a decision on the substance from 15 September. An autonomous mission in the framework of the ESDP? Or involvement in the mission of the OSCE (the presidency of which is to pass to Kazakhstan, a faithful ally of Russia, at the beginning of next year...)? The main uncertainty, however, concerns the creation of an eastern partnership (paragraph 7), which would, to a certain extent, represent what the Union for the Mediterranean represents for the southern part. The European Commission must make proposals in December, on which the European Council will decide in March 2009. This initiative raises concerns; the Mediterranean precedent is not, in my view, an encouraging one. An in-depth examination is required.
It remains for me to stress the interest of the debate at the European Parliament, in which several MEPs went beyond the language of diplomacy, for example to speak out against the shared responsibilities between Georgia and Russia in the conflict, and the role of the EU, which has been decisive in stopping it (see our bulletin yesterday). The analysis of the resolution adopted in the meantime will allow me to say more about the role of the EP.
(F.R./transl.fl)