The French Presidency of the Council of the EU has been presented by our press agency in the most appropriate manner - by resuming its programme, reporting on debates at the European Parliament and publishing a full feature in yesterday's newsletter as part of our 'Documents' series with a exclusive comments from the French secretary of state for European affairs, Jean-Pierre Jouyet. I have only a handful of comments to add to this.
1. Institutional deadlock following the Irish referendum. The repercussions are extremely serious. The French authorities had set up consultations with the aim of designating the three politicians to become the non-rotating president of the European Council, the president of the European Commission and the high representative for foreign and defence policy. This work has been blocked and at the same time, the highly complex preparations for establishing a single European diplomatic corps have also been interrupted. This is both frustrating and regrettable - but it is a legal imperative to respect the Nice Treaty measures that require a reduction in 2009 in the number of EU commissioners.
Far from being paralysed by this institutional deadlock, the EU has to step up its activity and this is the intention of the French Presidency, as it has made very clear.
2. Reinforcing operational objectives (and adding a new one). Analysis of the reasons why the Irish voted no has generated wide-ranging debate about the need to boost the EU's tangible work for citizens and to explain it better. The French Presidency seems to have got the message. The French prime minister, François Fillon, commented that the method the French had set themselves was to be in the heart of the action for positive results, and this would be the direction taken in their priorities. He said the important thing was for Europe to take decisions (in the plural) on the subjects of greatest interest to citizens. He said that the rising oil prices had yet again shown up the EU's inability to make decisions quickly and the EU now had to prove that it was close to citizens. In practice, Fillon added social policy to the four already published priorities (energy/climate, the future of the agricultural policy, immigration and defence). Last week, he convened an inter-ministerial committee meeting to study initiatives to be taken in this connection. The committee issued a press release stressing the need to lift the persistent doubts of public opinion about the social reality of the EU. Jean-Pierre Jouyet noted that the French would correct this lack and would ensure that social policy was the French Presidency's fifth priority.
Above all, the EU's work has to be accelerated and made visible. The European Commission is announcing new measures this week (see yesterday's newsletter) that have clearly been prepared in advance of any request from France. It is the visibility aspect that needs working on.
3. Defence and the intergovernmental danger. In my opinion, defence is one of the areas where the Lisbon Treaty introduces the greatest number of positive innovations for the EU, allowing member states who so desire to progress together effectively, and leaving member states who prefer to remain on the fringes of this to do so, or to participate to the extent that suits them.
France has kept the objective of ensuring the EU makes progress in this domain and has announced some measures. The fear is that the expected progress might take on a fully intergovernmental character because the frameworks and procedures incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty will not be there. I am aware that most defence issues lie outside EU institutions and procedures but the Lisbon Treaty, while respecting the special nature of defence, does introduce a significant European framework. In the absence of this, the danger of sliding towards a purely intergovernmental framework seems inevitable. One may legitimately hope that this will not be the final outcome given that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty remains on the agenda.
4. Four short-term objectives. In some domains, the French Presidency will only be able to prepare and lay the basis for changes that outstrip its six months in office. In other areas, however, the deadlines are looming - for example, the common agricultural policy health check (but Michel Barnier is planning to launch a broad debate now on the future of the CAP); various aspects of energy policy (including renewed relations with Russia); a balanced conclusion (or failure?) of the Doha global trade talks at the World Trade Organisation; and new rules for the financial markets.
I will return to the four issues of the moment in this column.
(F.R.)