The Declaration of Kigali is useful, but does not solve the problems. The European Parliament has postponed its vote on the state of relations between the EU and the associated states of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) until next month, to give it more time to seek a compromise between the main political groups (see yesterday's bulletin). In the meantime, the Declaration of Kigali, which was approved by the ACP-EU Joint Assembly, represents the position of the MPs of both sides; it has been published in its entirety in our series EUROPE/Documents (2472). This text takes no stance on EU-ACP relations as a whole, just on the one urgent aspect, that of the EPAs: economic partnership agreements (The Joint Assembly has taken position on other aspects in separate resolutions). On the subject of the Declaration, I would like to borrow the definition of our special envoy on the ground: “a compromise text, but not without muscle”. The text avoids none of the sensitive, in some cases controversial, points. In particular, the Joint Assembly:
Notes that the establishment of regional markets (between the ACP states) “represents a key instrument for successfully implementing EPAs” and a basis for the development of the ACP states;
It “notes with concern” that the European Commission has stated that if the EPAs are not in place, many exports from ACP countries which are not included on the list of least developed countries (LDCs) would be subject to customs duty upon their entry into the EU;
However, it stressed that the Commission must “honour commitments” it has made to ensure that the future commercial regime for the ACPs (including the ones which are not on the UN list of LDCs) must be “equivalent to their existing situation”;
It stresses that the “simplification of rules of origin is a prerequisite” for the correct functioning of the new regime, which must include the “appropriate asymmetries” (between the two sides) on sensitive products, the timetable for liberalisation and safeguard clauses;
It notes that the new generation of free-trade agreements which the Commission is negotiating with other third countries “could lead to the further erosion of trade preferences that ACP states currently enjoy”. The remedy suggested in the Declaration remains extremely vague: the EU must “provide adequate support for adjustment, enhanced competitiveness and diversification in ACP states”;
The Joint Assembly “is concerned” by provisions proposed by the European Commission in the fields of “services, competition, intellectual property, and government procurement”, noting that certain ACP regions do not wish to address these issues;
It calls for greater attention to the diversification of the revenue of the ACP states, which will, under the future regime, have to give up import duty on EU products.
Recommendations, not solutions. As we can see, all of the controversial aspects of the EPAs have been mentioned, but without giving any clear indication of solutions to the areas where differences of opinion exist. The few recommendations read more like a wish list. Imagining that adequate support from the EU would make the African countries suddenly able to face competition from Korea, Southeast Asia, Brazil and other countries with which the Commission is negotiating free-trade agreements is something more appropriate to a fantasy world. Imagining that the budgetary problems of the African countries caused by losing their customs revenue could be overcome just by paying greater attention to the problem means nothing in practice. Imagining that a genuine Eurafrican Union could result from nothing more than freedom of trade seems incompatible with the experience of half a century of European integration, which has proved that a real single market requires joint competition rules, identical sanitary and safety standards, respect for intellectual property (particularly if Africa opens up its borders to China) and clear rules of origin (ditto). All of this adds up to exactly what most of the ACP states reject. A reasonable level of reciprocal trade is possible even if these aspects are neglected, but in this case, do not talk about Eurafrican unity, just talk about removing customs duty and quantitative restrictions, together with financial aid: nothing more and nothing less than what actually exists; we all know the results.
The unrealistic plans of the Senegalese president. Other suggestions were put forward, and I would like to quote two of them: one by the president of Senegal and one by the European commissioner, Louis Michel. The one put forward by Abdoulaye Wade is significant for three reasons: it is, as far as I know, the only unambiguous text created by the president of an ACP state; it explicitly addresses the EU-Africa summit of 6 December; it calls on a member state (France) to adopt it, with a view to presenting it as a joint text in Lisbon next week.
The Senegalese president believes that the successive agreements of Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou were a failure, because African exports to Europe have consistently fallen, instead of increasing. But the replacement regime proposed by the EU is unacceptable, because: 1) instead of encouraging African unity, it creates a system of disintegration, by dividing Africa into five sub-regions; it accentuates the imbalance between Europe and Africa, by “supplying the African markets with subsidised European products”: this, he claims, will lead to enormous losses of customs revenue for the African countries (for which this revenue represents between 35 and 70% of the national budgets). The Senegalese president “says out loud what everybody is whispering”, which is that “most of the African countries reject these agreements”, and he concludes: “those in favour of a Europe-Africa Alliance must, therefore, look for an alternative”.
This alternative could be based on the following comments: a) Europe needs 20 million immigrants; b) with just two exceptions (Darfur and Somalia), Africa is now at peace; c) according to the best analyses, the future world will be “dominated by a quartet (the United States, Brazil, China and India) which excludes Europe. With Africa, Europe will be able to prove this forecast wrong!”
These three points are, in my view, questionable. But it is on the basis of them that Mr Wade is proposing a Europe-Africa strategic alliance “pooling the science, technology, know-how and financial capacity of Europe and the human potential and immense natural resources of Africa”. European aid would be jointly administrated, the creation of a joint area would permit European budgetary investment in Africa in a Keynesian sense, Euro-African agreements would replace the overly global WTO international agreement, Europe would delocalise its industries to Africa in order to compete with China and India and it would finance African infrastructure, “because whether Europe likes it or not, the Chinese will do it more quickly and more cheaply”.
I will leave it up to the reader to judge whether this plan is realistic as a potential replacement to the partnership agreements.
A far-sighted Louis Michel. In the meantime, Louis Michel has clarified his concept of the EPAs, of which he is a fervent supporter. Those of you who may be interested to learn more can read about it in our bulletin of this Wednesday 28 November (9552). The European commissioner feels that a “radical change of nature” compared to the current situation is required, moving instead towards a partnership which is as political in nature as it is economic, between partners who are equal in their rights and responsibilities. This would not, however, be an exclusive partnership: Europe “must forget the idea that Africa is its private playground” and acknowledge that Africa works with China, the Arab world, the United States and Japan.
The European position remains fairly singular, because the EU represents the number one outlet for African exports and the number one provider of aid and loans, to say nothing of the links resulting from history and languages. And how is this unique nature expressed compared to Africa's links with the other partners I have mentioned? Europe should not just be looking to Africa for its natural resources, but its investments should be aiming to develop the processing of these resources in Africa itself, bringing added value translating into extra jobs on the ground.
Where we get to, if we go down Mr Michel's road, is not far from where Mr Wade's road will get us, but it is based on the hypothesis of political and economic development of Africa which is far from reality. It presupposes that the continent will be free of all its internal conflicts and that the Africans states will function correctly, having wiped out corruption, and that they have a labour force which is already able to process mining and agricultural resources where they are. Several African countries are ready to do this, or are getting there; for others, it would be the terminus of a very long road for them to travel, not the start. Louis Michel is thinking of the future, but there are certain decisions be made in a few weeks' time.
The African countries are no longer united. At this moment in time, the situation is not being clarified; if anything, it's getting more complicated. The unity of the ACPs, which appeared perfectly real at Kigali, is starting to show the cracks: some countries have signed up to their EPAs this week (see of bulletin 9552), but others remain firmly opposed. A third European commissioner, Jan Figel, has added his voice to those of Mr Mandelson and Mr Michel, confirming the Commission's position before the European Parliament, welcoming partial agreements subscribed to by a few European countries and indicating that negotiations are making progress (see bulletin yesterday). But some of the MEPs reacted in the opposite way, stating that the Commission was undermining regional groupings, the very basis for the EPAs. However, time is getting on.
Just one way out to avoid chaos? My impression is that, in the immediate future, there is no other way out than to ask the WTO to extend the deadline of 31 December, for at least another year, emphasising the link between the exploration of the trade preferences and the conclusion of the Doha Round.
If no agreement is found, the expiration of the current trade regime, together with the inevitable delay in the entry into force of the revised Cotonou Agreement, may cause chaos.
(F.R.)