Yesterday I tried to indicate the reasons that led me to believe that Turkey would reach the conclusion that its accession to the EU as a full member was not the right formula for its future relations with Europe. I did not speak about the reasons that justified a similar conclusion from the European side: I'll simply say that none of the arguments generally used in favour of Turkish accession are, in my opinion, convincing. They can be put into four categories (plus one):
a) ideologies: the EU should not create the impression of being an exclusively “Christian club”. This myth has been sufficiently revealed as false by the facts. The prospects for Albania and Bosnia's accession are not in any way affected by fact that they have predominantly Muslim populations. It has not even been mentioned and it will be the same thing for Kosovo if political developments lead to the creation of an independent state. It should not be forgotten, however, that EU countries have carried out military interventions twice in Europe, both of them to defend Muslims (in Bosnia and Kosovo). It is not the EU that attributes a sacred character to a territory that has a specific religious predominance, with specific words to define it.
b) policies: expanding the stability zone and spreading freedom, democracy and other values. These objectives are obviously valid but they are not connected to accession. Europe is striving to diffuse its values throughout the world, in Africa as well as Asia and Latin America, without any thing to do with the status of being a member of the Union. The objection, according to which, in certain cases, a country attempts to draw nearer to European values in an attempt to meet accession criteria and that it would draw away it failed in this objective, is a dangerous one. It implies that freedom and democracy do not represent a heartfelt demand from the country but rather, a tactic for negotiation. Accession in these conditions would cast a very cloudy horizon for the future.
c) history: Turkey is part of European history and has been directly linked with it for centuries. This is an incontrovertible fact but it has nothing to do with joining the European Union. The USA has also been directly involved in European history, there's no denying it! Other countries have too but no-one would draw the conclusion that they should be able to join the Union. It was also pointed out that one European State had even called for an alliance with Turkey to fight another European country. The USA found itself in the same situation in the 20th century on two different occasions. Turkey is certainly a sensitive and very important political case. But I can't forget the recent remark made by Etienne Davignon (see this section in bulletin 9218): the EU should not have to solve specific or temporary difficulties by way of generalised or definitive decisions.
d) economics: they are linked to prospects opened up by the Turkish market Turkey's role in supplying energy to Europe. Once again: these are very serious issues but do not justify EU accession in themselves given that: the Turkish market is already open to European products (and the European market is open to Turkish products) as part of the Customs Union; the EU's biggest trading partner is the USA, the main oil suppliers are the Gulf States and the principal gas providers, Russia and Algeria. There is no question of any of these countries joining the EU, accession criteria simply do not apply.
Europe on the cheap? There is another thesis in favour of Turkish accession, which is not part of those already mentioned. Michel Rocard's thesis is based on the observation that the dream of a genuinely integrated Europe has vanished and that there is no chance of building a federal or political Europe. In a Europe on the cheap, why shouldn't Turkey have a place within it? Rocard acknowledges that Europe with Turkey onboard would be devoid of grand political goals. But if everything's been decided, let's be satisfied with building a Europe that's within our reach. I would describe Mr Rocard's position as one of “excessive realism” as it would close the door on hopes of relaunching a constitutional Europe and other ambitious developments.
Going beyond “theological debates” It is true that some reasons used to oppose Turkish accession are just as weak as those that I've mentioned arguing in its favour. For example, the former European Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, affirmed that opening the door to Turkish accession would mean that the historic victory against Turkish invasion at the doors of Vienna was in vain and that if Turkey had indeed participated in European history, it was always as an invader or occupying force. Such an image ignores the fact that wars between European countries have been just as horrible as those against outside invaders, that invasions were reciprocated and that the primary objective of European unity was indeed to make wars that had torn Europe asunder for centuries impossible ever again. European integration gets rid of the causes and even the possibility of internal wars; it would also be the case with wars against historic invaders, which are allies today. Those who are searching for arguments against Turkish accession already have their manual and bedside reading, Sylvie Goulard's concise book, “Le Grand Turc et la République de Venise”. The second edition is even more incisive than the first and it's not worth looking elsewhere.
Personally, I now doubt the usefulness of endlessly extending what I call the “theological debate” because what is important has been said and the arguments for or against are always the same, except for a few additional details. Looking back, I can see that there is noting really new to add to what I wrote last October. The articles in favour of accession were thus summarised (No. 9042) “definitive proof that the EU is not an exclusive Christian club; failed thesis of the inevitable clash of civilisations; loyalty to long-term commitments made by the EU”. Cultural arguments were used in an Istanbul Rotary Club brochure (supplemented by some fascinating photographic documentation) indicating, for example, that Abraham and Homer were born in what is now Turkish territory; the common history with Greece, Rome and Christianity; the generous welcome given to Jews when they were driven out of European countries and Russia. The name of Europe even comes from Turkey through the mythic person it portrays. These are undeniable facts. What is there that remains of this glorious cultural community beyond the meagre slip of the Mediterranean designating what is now known as the Turkish state?
Javier Solana understood everything. It is interesting to illustrate to what point Javier Solana had already anticipated last September, in terms that were pretty clear, the hypothesis of accession negotiations evolving definitively towards negotiations for a reinforced partnership (see this section in the already mentioned bulletin No. 9042). He highlighted the demand to “have Turkey as close to us as possible”, united together in a close relationship based on mutual trust. Nevertheless, asked about the hypothesis of this relationship not necessarily being full accession, Mr Solana replied, “but this is not the time to be saying that! Our offer was for Turkey to be a candidate. We are starting that process to move towards that goal. If, between now and then, it becomes clear (...) that it will be impossible to absorb the country of that size, for economic reasons, for example, that will be the time to take the appropriate decision".
It is true that the business community in Turkey is asking what might be an alternative formula given that the privileged partnership already exists with the Customs Union and the early stages of European financial and technical support. But new factors exist, such as the development of the Energy Community (the European Commission suggested that Turkey joins it) and the major guidelines for a reinforced privileged partnership have been elaborated over a number of months by the European Parliament (see this section in bulletin 9043). At present, with the progress of negotiations, problems of adapting to the political, social and religious reality in Turkey will become more obvious.
Double trap. At the same time European is experiencing more obvious difficulties both institutionally and in the domain of common policies, namely:
a) institutional functioning. In principle, the EU has retained, following lengthy and difficult negotiations, a new distribution of seats at the European Parliament and, above all, the principle of “double majority”, implying that Council decision will have to have a majority in both States and their populations. With these rules, Turkey would be the biggest national group at the EP with greater weight than any other Member State at the Council because its population is continually expanding while that of the biggest Member States is declining.
b) solidarity policies. Turkish accession would mean upsetting the two “solidarity policies”. Budgetary rules in common agricultural policies would become inapplicable financially, and cohesion policy would be shaken up. The European average income per capita would significantly go down with the result that regions in the old EU15 would be excluded from European support and that support to central and eastern European countries would be radically reduced, with Turkey becoming the main beneficiary. The only solution would consist in transforming the CAP and cohesion policy: the first would have to renounce subsidies and the second would simply become a way of paying cheques out to the poorest countries. These are two objectives shared by the United Kingdom and some other Member States. By losing solidarity policies, Europe will have accomplished its definitive transformation towards inter-governmentalism.
(F.R.)