The energy dossier is practically inexhaustible. Each time I devote one of my commentaries to it, I am aware of its shortcomings. Even aspects which seem fairly self-evident have counter-indications and have raised controversies. I'm not talking about nuclear energy or the extraction of bituminous shale, where all opposition is clear-cut. But there are also reservations about wind farms, criticism of port installations designed to store liquid gas, heated debates about the possibility of developing bio-fuel on a large scale, in a Europe where wide open spaces are few. To say nothing of underlying political manoeuvring and personal interests camouflaged as national interests. The European Commission should take account of all aspects, without fighting shy of tackling the "contentious subjects" as well, in the overview document it is preparing ahead of the March Summit (see this column in bulletin 9103). In the meantime, I will continue with my comments, few and far between though they are.
1. The EU and events between Russia and Ukraine. The agreement between Gazprom and Naftogaz neither resolves the conflict nor reduces the arguments. This is not so hard to understand, due to the special nature of relations between Russia and Ukraine. These two large countries are linked by history and culture (a proportion of Ukrainians speak Russian, and many of the big names in Russian literature were born in Ukraine, Gogol to mention but one), as well as by specific agreements concerning the Crimea and the former Soviet fleet. Moscow does not appear to have a problem with Ukraine's policy of moving closer to the EU, but its economic and political reactions are still pending. The Kiev government is now putting pressure on the EU to accept its country's application to join the EU, and Europe cannot take a decision which will involve its future borders, its neighbourhood policy and, quite obviously, its relations with Moscow, under pressure from events. Any emotive attitude would be completely out of place, on the part of both the Council and the European Parliament.
2. No changes to be made about Turkey. The same cautious attitude is required towards Turkey. Recent events have confirmed, or even reinforced, the importance of gas pipeline projects to bring gas from the Caspian Sea and the neighbouring countries to Europe, because the diversification of sources of supply is vital for the EU. But unlike many other observers, I believe that this strategic necessity has nothing to do with Turkish accession. You don't have to be a member of the EU to supply it with energy. We don't make countries a member of the Union because they have oil or gas to sell or to transport. The criteria are different, and they will not change.
3. Dependency is reciprocal. If Europe defines and applies efficient and resolute policies in the field of energy savings, the diversification of sources and the development of alternative energies, it will have nothing to fear from the blackmail of the supplier countries, Iran or any other. Each depends on its suppliers, but they also depend on it. There is an awfully long way between words and reality. 90% of Gazprom's exports go to the EU; this represents a vital resource for the Russian budget. During political crises with the United States, South American suppliers absolutely laid into the Washington authorities, but at no point did they stop their oil supplies, led by Venezuela. Bolivia would like to attract European investments, whilst negotiating new contracts, as is its right; it will have both, if it offers legal security. And everybody knows just how badly certain demands for autonomy reek of oil, be this in Iraq, Turkey or elsewhere. It is true that the growing energy requirements of China and India will help to sharpen competition, but these countries also need stability and reasonable prices. For them, the real enemies are terrorists.
4. Have confidence. The EU has the assets it needs to face up to the situation and improve it, as long as the Heads of State and Government have a "European reflex” on 23 and 24 March, even though certain orientations are highly controversial. On nuclear, if the positions of the Member States continue to move even further apart, we will have to accept that the choice will remain national, whilst giving those who oppose nuclear leave to continue their fight. Those orientations on which there is unanimity (the fight against waste, the preservation of the environment, support for the use of biomass) must be confirmed and consolidated at Community level, market opening in competition reinforced, scientific and technological progress (in the field of nuclear, the reduction of consumption in transport, the liquefaction of gas, etc) needs to be supported. If all of this comes to pass, Europe can and must have confidence in itself. (F.R.)