Are the negotiations on the “Doha round” going really badly? It's often said so; but in my view, they are making progress, because the true problems and true objectives are finally on the table. There are essentially three developments which have led me to this bold statement:
A. The “development cycle” aspect. This aspect, flagged as a priority objective from the very start, was in fact completely neglected as negotiations unfolded, as the negotiations were dictated by the “G20”, dominated Brazil, Canada, Australia, the USA, and supported by New Zealand and several others. This “handful of net agricultural exporters” (the definition comes from Peter Mandelson, see our bulletin 9074) has in practice blocked the negotiations by focussing them on the agricultural chapters; and Mr Mandelson has said: “In place of a development cycle, we would have a process of sectoral liberalisation for the use of the most competitive agricultural producers in the world”. The “G20” cannot agree on the compensation that the EU will get in the industrial sector and that of services, because the (entirely respectable) interests of the Brazil, India and other emerging countries do not overlap with those of the USA and others in the group. They are at an impasse.
Faced with this impasse, the EU finally has the reaction we were waiting for. If it is true that the development of the poorest countries is the priority of this round, Mr Mandelson observed, let us draw up at the Hong-Kong conference a package of measures in their favour, and he quoted: a) the generalisation of the arrangements applied by the EU's “Everything but arms” initiative (under which products from the poorest countries are allowed in without customs duties or restrictions on quantity); b) a specific agreement on cotton (in which the less advanced countries are competitive); c) better access to less expensive medications to combat pandemics. These countries should also benefit from the concessions to be exchanged for industrial products and services without any need for them to reciprocate. It is clear and simple, and this could perhaps be decided even if other aspects remain blocked. In this way, we would be able to see who considered “development round” a reality, and who considers it merely a slogan.
B. The ACP countries are seeing things more clearly. Initially aligned in part on the positions of the “G20” (and for a long time influenced by the misleading image of “fortress Europe”), African and Caribbean countries were burnt by the cases of bananas and sugar. The EU is now obliged, following pressure from G20 countries and organisations like Oxfam, to open up its borders to bananas and sugar from all over the world, and the ACP countries are realising what they lose in terms of tariff preference and price guarantees. Their representatives within the ACP/EU Parliamentary Assembly have demanded that “the interests of the ACP countries not be sacrificed on the altar of a forced and unfair liberalisation which is likely to increase marginalisation” and the “G90” (which brings together all of the less advanced countries - LAC - on the UN list) plus a few others, have announced that they are to draw up a joint position for the Hong-Kong conference (see our bulletin 9075). The LACs in general and the ACPs in particular would be happy if all the other countries were as open as the EU to their agricultural products. Their interest is to support the European positions, without giving in to rabble-rousing.
C. Europe is beginning to become aware of its real interests. In true British style, Peter Mandelson arrived in Brussels convinced that free trade, including in agriculture, was the cure for all evils, and that opening up the EU's borders to agricultural products from all over the world was both positive for Europe and beneficial to poor countries. The deepening of the dossiers and his own mental alertness enabled him to understand that these notions are as false as each other. The case of Mr Mandelson is indicative of a more general development. The EU countries which signed up to the “red lines” which were not to be crossed in terms of agricultural concessions are already in the majority (13 of 25), and we are awaiting a movement in the same direction from Germany (which would be significant) and other countries. But it is the general atmosphere which (apart from in Britain) has changed, including in the media and therefore also in public opinion, in favour of better understanding of the need for Europe to safeguard its agricultural activities for imperative reasons linked to territorial balance, biodiversity and the protection of nature. It is not a matter of trade, but of survival.
Is the objective to succeed in the Doha round? We can start negotiating seriously.
(F.R.)