Progress is genuine. I consider that the horrific and scandalous rejection of the Franco-German document on the institutional architecture of the EU (published in N.2311 of our Europe/Document series) would be an unforgivable tactical error. Several Convention Members are, however, leaning in this direction, including some "hard line" federalists and certain levels of the European Commission. This should be resisted. The document contains some significant steps in the right direction for safeguarding the "Community method" and should be leapt at as much as possible and considered as acquis.
Several weeks ago, who would have dared to imagine that a common agreement between France and Germany, would have supported the setting up of a "European Minister of Foreign Affairs" based at the European Commission? They did so and without using the precautions of terminology that even Commissioner Michel Barnier (who invented the formula) had considered opportune when he had come up with the "Secretary of the Union" for the new function resulting from the Solana-Patten merger. "Secretary of the Union" has no sense other than for getting a hearing from the Secretary of State of the USA, whereas European Minister of Foreign Affairs would have a clear role for everybody. Other spectacular progress could also be quoted: a) the Council will have to reach decisions by qualified majority voting, as a general rule; b) majority voting will also be applicable to foreign and security policy; c) all the legislative activity of the Council will be open to the public and exercised "in a general way" via co-decision with the European Parliament; d) budgetary competencies of the EP could be extended to taxation. The paper is both vigorous and clear in the assertion of the triple role of the Commission: driving force for European construction, guardian of the treaties and representing the general interest of the Union. Perhaps we will be able to recall that France and Germany spotted two mortal dangers to the Community method:
From the German side, the draft for transforming the Council into a second legislative chamber by removing any participation at an executive level. The result would be removing the Union's political ambitions, as it is unthinkable to get rid of Ministerial managerial functions completely: the Union will lose its essence. The Franco-German document explicitly asserts that the "Council will exercise greater operational responsibilities". The idea, therefore, of setting up a second legislative chamber is confirmed as well as the demand to separate its operational tasks and legislative activities;
From the German side, the weakening of the Commission's role by in practice removing its essential characteristics - its autonomy and exclusive right of initiative. The document is based on the "enhancing of the institutional triangle, preserving its balance". For the Commission, in particular, its is foreseen that: a) its role will be strengthened in the area of economic policy (see yesterday's section); b) its will be given the means to "fully exercise" the task of follow-up, as well as controlling the correct application of the Council's decisions by Member States": c) ensuring more effectively its democratic legitimacy, "without damaging its independence or autonomy".
Two mistakes to rectify. How can the positive elements be ignored? I haven't attempted to hide the negative aspects. On the contrary, I believe that I have illustrated them in my first commentary by asserting that modifications are indispensable to the Chirac-Schröder project: 1) the President of the European Council elected by his peers should not exercise this function full-time but should also keep his national responsibilities; 2) responsibility for preparing the Summits and making sure that its decisions are taken by the Commission (the long-term President keeping the other functions planned, including that of guiding and Chairing the Summits).
I believe, nevertheless, that even if the "mistakes" have been spelt out, creating the impression of a battle of competencies" between the institutions must be carefully avoided. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing observed: "It is a debate that newcomers find passionate and which galvanises the political scene in Brussels but which has little impact on the general public". No-one will be able to mobilise citizens with the argument of defending its own prerogatives. The debate therefore has to focus on principles". The Chirac/Schröder project asserts: "Europe is a Union of countries, peoples and citizens"; it even takes up the famous Jacques Delors definition of a "federation of United-Nations" by sweeping away the pernickety objections of the legal experts. The countries are represented by the European Council and the Council. The President of the Summit fulfils this representative function insofar as he effectively represents his country; this is where his legitimacy resides. He could therefore be an acting Head of Government. In other words, he invests the role of the institutions which represent the people. (F.R.)