It's not in Agence EUROPE that those disposed to gossip and stirring things up have been able enjoy space, be it over cutting remarks between Romano Prodi and Guy Verhofstadt, or badly closed microphones that let through words not intended for the public, or statements by this or that diplomat or university professor believing they know things that the common mortal ignores. This does not mean that I'm unaware of the significance of some small phrases that tend to point to a reality that cannot be uttered, or of the scars that these (seemingly) innocent pleasantries can leave on those at whom they are levelled. It is at times cruel, the game of innuendoes or indiscretions that are let out in full knowledge that they will not be lost, as such or such a newspaper will piously take them up. I have no intention of belatedly entering this little game, but try to draw some lessons, in some cases, I fear, too belatedly, as the harm has been done.
1. The ambiguity of the three-way meeting that preceded the Ghent Summit. It's a typical example of a non-event, badly managed by both the three who met (Chirac, Schroeder and Blair) and those who, left out, felt their feathers ruffled. Some susceptibilities were wounded through clumsiness, as the German Chancellor acknowledged when declaring to the "Monde": "had we foreseen the problems that this meeting would arouse, we would possibly not have met". But as to substance, he convincingly explained that the object of the meeting did not lend itself to a discussion in an enlarged framework, and even less so at the Summit: "What we spoke about concerned the request the United States made of these three countries (France, Germany, the United Kingdom). There was no reason to discuss it within the context of the EU. This is normal and obvious, and stems from the fact that, regarding the common foreign and security policy, we are still a the beginning of a process. What could the Americans ask of the Union? Their requests can at this stage only be addressed to the different States, not Europe yet". The requests in question were of a military nature: as soon as Italy and Spain announced that they too were to participate in actions of this type, the co-ordinating Summit were enlarged, and even further when it appeared that the meeting in London exceeded military issues. Furthermore, from the outset, the list of 47 American requests relating to the legal, financial and regulatory aspects (for which the Union is competent) was addressed to the EU as such. The remedy is thus obvious: include as many areas as possible in Community competencies. But do all Member States agree?
After a somewhat over-the-top remark regarding the meeting in Ghent, Romano Prodi has just declared that meetings of this type "have always been good for Europe, are part of its political tradition". The Commission is not upset at its absence, nor does it ask to participate.
2. A Board is possible, if…. The fears of a three-way Board of large countries are only justified in the hypothesis of an EU having gone off track, that would have strayed from the path drawn out by the Fathers of Europe, and allow the "Community method" to collapse. The essential element of this method is not majority voting, as some commentators believe, lacking the historical perspective. Certainly, majority decisions are important, but they are but one element of a whole based on a European Commission independent of governments, responsible for the general interest and having a monopoly of the right of initiative, and on a Parliament co-legislator with the Council. There is no possible Board in areas where this method works. Some countries like Belgium and Luxembourg have understood this well and have always backed the principle of a strong Commission and a Parliament with growing powers; other small Member States which arrived later seem obsessed by the fear of supranationality, without being aware that it is the intergovernmental method that sidelines them.. This attitude is understandable on the part of countries which reject a political Europe and a defence Europe on principle; but they must then be prepared for the advent of a vanguard, as other countries will move forward anyway. As for Italy, it must understand that this future vanguard will represent a whole: there can be no question of being part of it yet choosing this or that chapter and rejecting what this or that minister doesn't like, for example the common armaments policy. Renato Ruggiero has a clear vision of this whole, but his task is not easy as his prime minister still seems to be hesitating between the improbable search for intergovernmental alliances and backing the Community method, whereas the defence minister… What a coincidence: this minister has the same name as the former foreign minister who, in 1994, had officially taken a stance against the euro causing the storm we know. On checking, it's the same person. Still there, this dear Antonio Martino? In these circumstances, the decision that Silvio Berlusconi will take in the coming days on Italy's participation in the new large military transport plane, the A400M, will be of major symbolic significance. But not only symbolic: according to Renato Ruggiero, participation in this project represents "a great political opportunity for Italy (in view of future defence Europe) and for growth for its industry, in the perspective of a clear and firm participation in the development of a European defence industry". From the Italian aspect, the situation is thus clear: either Berlusconi can see far and retain his confidence in Renato Ruggiero on European policy, or he gives in to the "bilateral sirens" (and American), and Italy's role in Europe will be diminished for a certain number of years. But this is a choice for Italy itself.
Spain's position, on the other hand, is not all that clear to me; its government seems prepared to participate in all new field of integration, with foremost the area of security, freedom and justice, and Esdp, but at the same time rejects the idea of a European vanguard. Is this not contradictory in part? I'd like some explanations.
3. There is no plot against Italy. I regard as totally unjustified any assimilation between criticisms levelled at Berlusconi and those levelled at the President of the Commission, interpreted as two chapters in an action aimed at sidelining Italy. Such plots do not exist in the EU. At the time, nobody interpreted criticisms levelled at Jacques Santer as being an attack on Luxembourg, no one today interprets criticisms levelled at Wim Duisenberg as an attack on the Netherlands. The same goes here, and Italy would be mistaken in assuming the attitude of a victim. Furthermore, as to substance, the clumsiness of which Mr. Berlusconi is accused (and which he disputes) firstly concerning Islam, another time the fall of Socialism in Europe, have nothing to do with the criticisms levelled at Romano Prodi. On one point, the latter is right: the adamant defence of the prestige and the role of the European Commission, essential element of the "Community method". But he was ill-advised in his remarks on the press conferences of Guy Verhofstadt, who - speaking in two languages - left him no room to intervene. Has nobody informed Prodi that you should never touch upon linguistic issues, especially in Belgium? Immediately after these remarks, the country's press was filled with unpleasant or ironic indiscretions on the real weight of the President of the Commission in Summits, obviously leaked to journalists by Belgian circles, and rapidly spread throughout the world through press agencies. Other more important factors no doubt played in the disputes that followed: preparations for the forthcoming political battles on institutional reform, Prodi's stance on safeguarding the Community method and the future role of the Commission. We are here touching upon questions of substance to which we shall return. It is, however, paradoxical that Belgium should have been at least in part at the origin of the storm tending to weaken the President of the Commission; true, its linguistic nerve, sensitive as it is, should not have been touched.
4. The Commission must purse its path. It's so obvious that it's almost banal to say it: whatever the polemics surrounding its president, the European Commission must remain true to its mission, i.e., define and defend the European interest and use its right of initiative to propose what it considers to be useful for the Union's objectives. Sure, there is not lack of positive examples, with foremost (we shall realise this one day) the plan for "sustainable growth" approved by the Gothenburg Summit. At the same time, it has to carry out its managerial responsibilities, which at time are enormous, be it in the field of competition or agriculture, the single market or infringements to Community law. Some of its initiatives or decisions do and will continue to be unpopular, that's how the cookie crumbles.
At the same time as having its rights respected and defending its role, it has to recognise those of others and never try to exercise competencies that do not belong to it. In certain fields, governments have retained their powers and national parliaments have not transferred them to the Union: in these fields, the Commission has to accept a lower-key role. It is not a "European government" as it shares its executive powers with the Council, and in some areas it does not even have legal weapons to act: it has to accept that. It is facts that gradually demand the enlargement of Community competencies. We see that already: one day it's the European arrest warrant (which in normal times would have taken years of debates and that has to be adopted by 7 December, "otherwise we shall look ridiculous to public opinion", in the words of Chancellor Schroeder), another day it's the single European sky that Member States continue to dispute but which seems increasingly urgent and indispensable. And the list will lengthen. Remains to be seen whether Member States will all be prepared to follow; there lies the debate on the future of Europe. (F.R.)