It discourages reading. Now that the Treaty of Nice is there, and anybody can brows the 100 pages that form it, the assessment generally agreed upon becomes a near banality: institutional reform stunted and insufficient, which nevertheless represents everything that could have been expected in the present political circumstances and which does not block the Union and even less paralyse the accession negotiations. Other more radical interpretations have also emerged, the most colourful, in harmony with the character, being that of Jean-Louis Bourlanges, who invites not to ratify the Treaty and considers it as "the greatest French diplomatic defeat". Obviously we must also take into account these reactions and discuss them. Let us stay for the moment in calmer waters.
Preliminary remarks: we are forced to note, once more, the extent to which a Community document discourages reading. With a few exceptions, the Nice Treaty does not indicate anywhere the text as it results from the negotiation, so that the world of the mortals may come to understand it. The new Treaty is formed of amendments to the present Treaty, and the readers will read page after page that in such a paragraph they must include or remove a few words, that this or that paragraph (indicated by a number and a letter) is removed, and that another is added. To understand the new text of an Article, one must undertake a comparison, insertion and removal. Distribute the Treaty of Nice to the citizens and they will wonder if they are being laughed at. It is urgent to establish the consolidated text that stems from the Nice Treaty, if we want people to be interested in the future national ratification. In the meantime, outside of the circles directly concerned and lawyers, only one interest for the public lies in the protocols that clearly indicate the new allocation of votes within the Council and the formation of the European Parliament with the number of members on a country by country basis.
The true dangers are elsewhere. That said, the full text is necessary as includes elements that in Nice the Heads of Government have not even spoken, for example the inclusion in the Treaty of ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) alongside CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), or the new statute, very important, of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. Some spectacular developments are obvious, such as the nomination by majority of the Commission President and Mr CFSP. The remainder, is the hardly glorious result of the bargaining we have seen. We are aware of disappointing a certain number of those who have the passion of Europe with this hardly dramatic and rather appeasing interpretation, but in the present circumstances the flamboyant stances seem to us to be misplaced. The Nice Treaty is mediocre and confused over the voting procedures, insufficient, but still positive over the transition to qualified majority voting and potentially dangerous over the formation of the Commission, but it is not scandalous, as the progress is there, beside the failings.
The true dangers are elsewhere, they are not in the text of the Treaty, but in the way in which the last compromises were reached in Nice. What is dangerous, is the "Community method", which alone can save the EU from a slow disintegration towards the intergovernmental method. It is impossible to mobilise public opinion around this theme. What is important is that the meaning of the stakes are clear for the Member States (notably for the small) and especially for the Community Institutions. The Commission seems to be aware, according to the "personal message" released this week, after ten days of reflection (see page 5 of this bulletin) and the declaration from last week from its spokesperson (see bulletin dated 16 December, page 3). As for the European Parliament it expressed its determination to act in the direction wanted, and the studies and analysis that will take place under the responsibility of Giorgio Napolitano will no doubt confirm the requirement of safeguarding the institutional balance and thus the "Community method".
Not mistaking the target. Though we must pay attention not to miss the target. The whole battle against the pre-eminent role of the Heads of Government would be eroded and especially useless: a rear guard battle. The increasingly direct implication of Heads in European affairs is logical and even positive from several points of view: their democratic and representational nature is unquestionable, as well as their right to talk on behalf of the people that have chosen them, moreover, their visibility for public opinion is an asset for Europe. Either way, they long longer move back: their determination to play the role is final. The EU can not only live with it but benefit from it, on condition that be clearly inserted into the institutional mechanism and that the Commission is able to fully play its crucial role.
A system exclusively based on negotiations between Heads of Government would inevitably transform itself into the primacy of some over the others, small countries would inevitably have to give way, the notion of common European interest would lose all meaning. There is no need to go on about that, in Nice already participants felt the worrying premises of such a development (in which, in fact, all would be losers, even those believing that they can momentarily take advantage by clipping the Commission's wings or sidelining the Parliament).
A contradiction that need not exist. The tendency to assess the outcome of Nice as a kind of joust between Member States, with winners and losers, is, we believe, already excessive even in the initial evaluations by Community institutions. Parliament places emphasis on the discrepancies between national and European interests, as if there were inevitably a contradiction between the two. Yet, to regain the confidence of public opinion and hand back the European dream to them, we must try to prove that there is no contradiction but similarity between the two. Let's avoid pitting them against each other, especially when the debate - as was the case at times in Nice - touches on the "soul of nations" (as one commentator put it), the institutional weight of the different countries, their history, their prestige. We fully understand what Parliament meant to say: that at times, such or such a Head of Government forgot the European interest, thus the interest of all. In the aforementioned document, the Commission does not say otherwise. But emphasize should rather be placed on the fact that when acting in that way the Head of Government concerned also neglects the well-understood interest of his or her own country. And especially avoid establishing classifications, distinctions between losers and winners.
Very random classifications. This is what the Commission's Secretary General did in the heat of the moment, setting out as "winners" the United Kingdom and Spain, and as "losers" Belgium, Portugal, Germany and the Commission. His was no internal note void of official character, but who could have imagined that it would not reach the press? Or that it should not be used here or there with polemical intentions? It may in part be to erase the effects of this note that, after much reflection, the Commission has published the "message to staff", signed by Michel Barnier and Romano Prodi, and which obviously avoids any reference to winners and losers. Furthermore, the aforementioned reaction of Jean-Louis Bourlanges proves to what extent classification of losers and winners are random: for him, the big loser is France, the real winner Germany …In fact, given the general (or almost) will in Nice to avoid failure, it was not difficult to "win" in the sense of affirming one's own position on such or such a point; all it took was to refuse to budge. Is that victory? Spain wanted to retain its right of veto on the spread of financing from the Structural Funds until 2007; is that a victory? Unanimity thus remains necessary to define not only the spread but also the overall budget of the Structural Funds, and too rigid an attitude on the part of Madrid could discourage the generosity of the "net contributors". Fortunately, between now and negotiations, many situations can still evolve.
For its part, the United Kingdom requested, and secured, the retention of its right of veto on tax and certain aspects of social policy. The Heads of Government demonstrated understanding (how to avoid it?) towards Tony Blair's position, who, despite his desire (that we believe sincere) to place his country "at the heart of Europe" is obliged to take account of an almost hysterical press (the definition is not ours but of the very British Chris Patten, for whom a year in Brussels has sufficed for him to greatly understand the European reality) that influences a large slice of public opinion and a considerable part of the political opposition. For many Brits, European integration remains an enterprise whose goal is to gradually destroy all that makes their country special: traditions, way of life, culture. And this climate is shored up by a press that has not changed since the time when, if an initiative was suggested in Brussels (tactless, true) aimed at including in public procurement a small reserve earmarked for embellishing works, the British reader learnt that Eurocracy wanted to force them to decorate bridges, palaces and motorways with busts of Jacques Delors, at their expense. Today, nobody in Brussels would think of taking away from national authorities the control of their tax policies nor regulate their social security. But if that is the presentation made in London, no Head of Government intended pushing Tony Blair to the brink of electoral suicide.
The weapon to circumvent certain "vetoes" is there. A weapon to circumvent certain vetoes does now exist, and it is called enhanced cooperation (on condition that it is interpreted in the way Jacques Delors does, and that Germany and Italy shared in their joint paper: that of vanguard). There will no longer be a right of veto to prevent "enhanced cooperation", and eight Member States will suffice to create it. Europe has created its currency and Schengen without the British, and without some others; many other possibilities exist without some, but without of course touching upon the large market that belongs to all. We don't want it but nor should we fear it.
Ferdinando Riccardi