The European Commissioner responsible for external relations, Chris Patten has initiated the debate on the demands, constraints and priorities of the EU's policy in this field. He has done so in a succinct paper (which he drew up himself without passing through drafts prepared by the services) which he has forwarded to the College urging it to engage in a policy debate. The Commission will do so in one of its forthcoming meetings (see our daily bulletin of 8 June, p.7).
The tone of the Commissioner Patten's communication is unusual for an official document. It notes that today we no longer turn to God to deliver us from evil but to the EU; that certain "invitations" from Member States to the Commission have the nature of Mafia offers that cannot be refused, etc.. As for substance, he strongly disputes the thesis according to which the Commission should deal with technical matters and demands that the Commission has its own role vis-à-vis third countries (including in the field of the production and trade in weapons). He suggests some orientations concerning the rigorous choice of priorities, the requirement to have the financial means to meet objectives, as well as the need to avoid the creation of "parallel structures" within the Commission's administration itself.
We here publish this document in full in the two languages in which it is available (English and French), document whose somewhat provocative nature is obviously intended to open a frank and open debate.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS: DEMANDS, CONSTRAINTS AND PRIORITIES
1. This short paper considers why external relations are a core function for the Commission. The paper goes on to discuss constraints which complicate the Commission's exercise of that function, and some guidelines that might govern our approach. Finally, it raises one important internal management problem.
The Commission's external role
2. One of the EU's five objectives (Article 2 ) is to:
"assert its identity on the international scene"
That objective reflects:
The EU's political interests, as an 'international actor, and its developing security interests;
The EU's economic interests (in the Common Commercial Policy; the external dimension of the Single Market, including the CAP; the Euro);
Rapidly growing responsibilities for external assistance (the EU and its Member States account for 55% of all international aid, and some 66% of all grant aid);
Defensive interests (e.g. drugs trafficking; environmental issues; migration);
Enlargement and relations with the periphery (recall, for example, that twenty years ago relations with Spain and Portugal were "external").
In any case, like it or not, the Commission has to respond to an active global social conscience. In the past people asked God to deliver them from evil. Today they look to international institutions - and in Europe that means the EU.
Our overall task might be summarised as "projecting stability". The US is not isolationist, but it is, prone to unilateralism - and that tendency will be reinforced if Europe is not seen to do more for itself. US unilateralism also increases the potential EU contribution to a world which is struggling to develop an effective multilateral economic, legal and political framework to contain the passions of states, to help manage relations between them, and to contribute to "globalisation maitrisée".
3. Very well, some might argue, but foreign policy is the concern of states. The Council may have a role, but the Commission should refuse to be distracted from its core (internal market) tasks:
This is mistaken from a legal standpoint. The Commission has Treaty obligations under Article 3:
"The Union shall... ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic, and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall co-operate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers."
It is also mistaken in practice. "Foreign policy" may be principally for our Member States (though some European politicians would dispute that) but "external relations" are a larger concept. The Commission plays a leading role in external trade policy, in development assistance and in other external activities which crowd in, upon us even in sectors which were formerly "internal" (such as competition, environment and consumer protection). That is why this Commission identified "a stable and enlarged Europe with a stronger voice in the world" as one of its key priorities.
US unilateralism is a function not only of its pre-eminent power, but also of its geography. It can contemplate technological solutions - such as National Missile Defence - to the threats that it faces. The accent of its foreign policy is consequently on tools (military threats and action) which, in Europe, are a Member State competence. Europe, by contrast, can only achieve security by engaging constructively with its nearest neighbours. This requires an accent on the tools suggested above, which are matters of EC competence Even with the emergence of the CFSP High Representative, Member States look to the Commission to manage the nuts and bolts of that engagement, and to do much of the donkeywork.
4. The Commission does not have the luxury of choosing to stand back and concentrate on internal affairs - even if the public conscience would allow it. The rise of NGOs and the influence of the media (bringing famine and genocide into people's living-rooms) have increased pressures for multilateral activism. The EU - as the basis of Europe's political and economic architecture - cannot escape its obligations. A decision not to engage in a given area had we not tried, for example, to resolve the problem over rules of origin in the occupied territories) can itself constitute an "external policy" with political and economic implications.
Constraints which complicate the Commission's execution of its external responsibilities
5. The Commission is a unique creation, which acts partly in its own name and partly at the "invitation" of Member States (in the Mafia sense of offers we cannot refuse). Increasingly we are also driven by pressures from the European Parliament.
The Member States look to the Commission to come up with idea/actions. They claim to want a muscular Common Foreign and Security Policy. But they often resent or seek to deny the sovereignty implications of that choice (i.e. that it implies limits on national freedom of action). The lack of consensus on what the EU really is, and what it should aspire to be, has particularly acute repercussions in the external field;
Partly in consequence, CFSP still lacks beef. "Joint actions" and "Common strategies" were designed to inject substance into common policy - but they have not yet achieved much in practice;
Our contribution is hampered by the Commission's limited "foreign policy" role. We operate through institutional structures, in the external political field, that are still embryonic. There is an unresolved tension between intergovernmentalism and Community powers (e.g. in mixed agreements);
The - welcome - creation of the CFSP High Representative doubling as Council Secretary General has not helped to resolve this tension. Indeed it has given rise to some new institutional complications. It may also have increased the tendency for CFSP to usurp functions which should be the responsibility of the Commission (e.g. the EC Monitoring Mission to the Balkans, which was dreamt up by CFSP and then left as an expensive baby on the Commission's doorstep);
Ministers and Heads of Government make ringing political declarations, which they are subsequently reluctant to underwrite in money and staff. The Commission is left to wrestle with the contradictions, and blamed for inadequate outcomes;
In 1990 Category 4 commitments were E1.9bn. This year they are E8.2bn, including pre-accession assistance. This exponential growth has not been matched by concomitant increases in Commission staff or other administrative resources. The problem becomes acute wherever we are asked to extend our efforts from analysis/co-ordination to real business (e.g. management of aid funds; Energy for Democracy);
Ambiguity about the limits of the Commission's role is particularly acute in the security field. The skirmish over our right to attend the interim Military Body was a symptom of this problem. Member States are schizophrenic about the need for Commission involvement in armaments trade and production. They know they need Community disciplines if they are to become competitive, but they are reluctant to cede powers in an area of pre-eminent "national interest";
6. Our position might be caricatured as that of a maid who is asked to prepare increasingly large and grand dinners in a pokey kitchen with poor ingredients. The host is congratulated by the guests on the gleaming silver and the food (which our excellent staff have usually managed to convert into something half-palatable). But the maid is berated for the long gaps between courses, and left to clear up the mess.
What should be the Commission's strategy in the face of such constraints?
7. I suggest a few guidelines which, might govern our approach:
We should act as a "reality check" on CFS initiatives, and seek to focus the EU's efforts.
Our best defence against the "maid" syndrome described above is to use our Community powers well, and make the contribution of which we are capable, in Pillars 2 and 3. Our competitive advantage is our expertise. We must render ourselves indispensable (like the Admirable Crighton).
More generally, we should concentrate on areas in which there is an identifiable "value added" to policy conducted at the European rather than the national level. We should resist temptation or encouragement to over-extend, while recognising how hard that is in the face of organised lobbies - not least in the EP - which seek to engage us in every problem, every country and every dialogue (ASEM, EU-Africa, Central America);
We must therefore be rigorous in setting priorities. We have set aside E50m for example, for reconstruction after Hurricane Mitch (if we ever manage to spend it). That is more than our average annual commitment to Egypt in recent years, and more than twice as much as we spend annually in Russia. Do these numbers reflect policy choices or happenstance? Ministers agreed, after the unprecedented budget discussion at the May GAC, to discuss strategic priorities at the next Gymnich meeting. I hope that that discussion will have operational implications. The College's orientation debate on the basis of the present paper will inform my contribution.
In our effort to focus our external relations activity, we cannot leave whole areas of policy to one side. EU/US, for example, will always be a matter of prime concern, and that is all the more true with the imminent arrival of a new US Administration. But this Commission agreed, in the priorities exercise earlier this year, that our prime focus should be on the "near abroad". We need to face up to the consequences of that choice.
We should resist efforts to involve us where Member States are not prepared to put money behind their rhetoric. When I was in the Middle East in early April, for example, I stressed that we did not at present have funds to help consolidate a successful conclusion to the Peace Process, if that happy situation is reached. If (as I hope) the Member States do want to make a joint contribution to the peace, this will require new money. We need to make that clear from the outset. We are right to have asked the budgetary authority to make advance provision for the funds we will need in Serbia if Milosevic falls.
Rather than seek out new areas of activity, we should concentrate on doing the things we already do, but better (and faster). That is the motive for the proposed reform of external assistance management. It is the logic behind the Rapid Reaction Facility, too (which we must use with discretion, not allowing confusion with tasks which remain the business of ECHO). I see the revamping of our External Service as a major priority.
We must seek to resolve ambiguities surrounding the Commission's role in such fields as the external dimension of JHA, security and armaments.
Poverty focus is an important development policy priority. But it must not distort our strategic focus. Nor do we help poor people by supporting poor policies and bad Governments.
We must beware of building parallel structures in the Commission and in the Council Secretariat. There is an obvious danger of this in the field of crisis management. I am determined that the new unit we are establishing in DG Relex should co-ordinate the Commission's input into the mechanisms being established in the Council Secretariat. It must not replicate them.
We should work with' the CFSP High Representative and with successive Presidencies to pare down the number of pro forma meetings in the external relations calendar.
We should maximise our influence across the whole range of our responsibilities as a Commission, by seeking to programme regular visits by Commissioners to our most important international interlocutors. This would also help to communicate, both within the Commission and. outside it, that our work in the Relex field is not just reactive.
An unresolved management problem
8. If the College accepts - as I would contend - that work in the external relations field is a central priority, we must face, up to a resource-priority conundrum. Much of the value-added that the Commission brings to external relations is in its sectoral expertise. Deepening relations with other countries (which brings political and economic dividends) is not achieved by posing for pictures with their Heads of State, but by engaging in exchanges, sharing expertise, and launching joint programmes.
9. Such activities and programmes, however, whose sum is greater than their parts, is, likely to be a low priority for each separate DG. I understand, for example, why customs, co-operation in the Balkans is not a top priority for DG TAXUD (though it may prove to be in their enlightened self-interest insofar as it helps to curb smuggling from the Balkans into the EU).Yet it is a very high Relex priority. The same applies to co-operation with FYROM as they begin to focus on their new competition legislation. It applies to educational exchanges with countries outside the EU. It applies to consumer affairs and environmental dialogues.
10. As we pursue the "negative priority" exercise and the Peer Review process, how can we safeguard Relex as a Commission priority, which may not however be identified as a priority by sectoral DGs and their Commissioners? This issue emerged in the debate over the Balkans Task Force. But it is a problem of more general application. Could there be a case for ring-fencing a minimum, level of external relations activity within sectoral DGs?
Chris Patten