Unachievable objectives. Suppose we could take the EU's relations with Mediterranean third countries and start over from scratch. Not in the sense of tossing in the bin all existing agreements and instruments, but of initiating a thorough review of the objectives and arrangements of co-operation. Over and above circumstantial declarations and statements of intent, what has been done so far is in large measure a failure. The lack of balance between the EU's commitment to the East and its commitment to the Mediterranean region is being denounced by a growing number of political forces. In the East, despite considerable difficulties and a vague and uncertain timeframe, the perspectives are clear: the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries and the Stability Pact -with a possible evolution- for the Balkans. The instruments and methods of action have been clearly defined. Theoretically, the perspectives have also been defined for the Mediterranean region: a unified Euro-Mediterranean area founded on free trade. A timetable has been drawn up and certain mechanisms exist: the Barcelona process, the network of bilateral association agreements, the Meda programme. So why do we have this impression of failure? Why has the EU been incapable of defining a common strategy for this region, which was nevertheless explicitly required by the European Council? (See EUROPE of 21 April, pages 7-8)
We are of the opinion that the reason is as simple as it is radical: the objectives of the EU's policy in the Mediterranean region are erroneous. The Union should have the political courage to re-examine them together with its partners, free of all prejudices. We are going to endeavour to set out a few ideas for such reflection.
What does a unified Euro-Mediterranean area mean? Obviously, an area without frontiers covering both the EU countries and the third countries bordering the Mediterranean. Take a look at the map: the Mediterranean rim is unbroken, but economic frontiers must disappear before the objective can be achieved. What do we see in reality? That the unified area exists on the European side, but that it does not exist and is not foreseen for the other. It is quite extraordinary that political figures who speak about relaunching this project and calling for more energetic EU action to achieve it do not even mention this anomaly. And yet, if this aspect is neglected, the protests of Members of the European Parliament and statements of good will by the European Commission or different Member States are nothing more than empty words.
No private investment is possible if a market is not available. Let's take an example. In spite of efforts, encouragement and incentive measures, European private investment in Mediterranean third countries is not getting off the ground. Why are EU companies not investing? Riccardo Perissich, former Director General for Industry at the Commission and director of a multinational today, answered this question: as a general rule, the market of any single Mediterranean third country is too small to justify a considerable investment. If the markets were unified and free of barriers, if products made in one country had free access to the markets of the others, there would be investments. In the absence of a clear and credible project along these lines, with precise deadlines, there will be no large-scale investments. The European Commission's document on Euro-Mediterranean industrial co-operation (currently being prepared with a view to the forthcoming Conference of Industry Ministers from both sides) is rare in its insignificance. It contains what may be a few useful suggestions (creating a network of investment agencies, organising joint participation in fairs or other events, financing the training of specialists, etc.) and some strokes of inspiration that fire the imagination (such as joining two working groups into one); but the fundamental point, i.e. that "no investment is possible if a market is not available", is not even mentioned in passing. Enough to make you rub your eyes thinking you've missed something. (See analysis of the Commission's document in our bulletin of 3 May, p.13).
The Mediterranean countries are obviously masters of their own political and economic choices. If they do not want to create a common market or real co-operation with each other, it's their business. Europe cannot lecture them because it has taken a considerable number of wars -and what wars- to convince it to work for unity. The Mediterranean countries have their reasons for acting as they do. But the conclusion must be drawn: there will be no unified Euro-Mediterranean area. This is not a question of doctrine or opinion: it is a fact. A unified area of 27 countries cannot be built if half of them maintain barriers with each other. The timeframe, the Barcelona process and the other instruments (which are not producing results, and for a very good reason) can do nothing to change this state of affairs and cannot be relaunched by patchwork. European institutions and politicians can continue their verbal exercises if that amuses them. It is not our role.
The false alternative. An alternative remains theoretically possible: a network of free-trade areas between the EU and each of the Mediterranean third countries taken separately. Here we touch upon the second aspect of the review: are free-trade areas the right solution?
Readers who have been following this column for some time are familiar with our opinion. We consider the idea of proposing free-trade areas in every direction to be the biggest strategic error of the European Commission's external policy, with the Council following like sheep (oh immortal Panurge, why do politicians forget your teachings so quickly?), up until the time it became fed up and rejected in under two weeks the latest proposal, even more outrageous than the others, namely the single market with the United States. But free-trade areas had already been launched with Mercosur and other Latin American countries, all the Mediterranean countries, the ACP states (which are beginning to become aware of the trap), and there were prospects for such areas with Russia, Ukraine and still others. Our objective is not to rewrite history, but simply to invite the institutions to do what has never been done: to evaluate seriously the repercussions of these free-trade areas being promised left and right, taking account of WTO rules which impose the abolition of customs duties, quantitative limits and other restrictions on most trade.
But let's get back to the Mediterranean region. In agriculture, free trade is politically and economically unacceptable for the EU and ruinous for the food future of the Mediterranean third countries. In industry, it would represent for these countries the end of all industrialisation projects adapted to their economy, which is based essentially on small and medium-sized enterprises.
In agriculture, the EU has attained the danger point on possible concessions for Mediterranean products, if it hopes to maintain its own production of citrus fruit, olive oil, certain fruits and vegetables, and grapes at a sufficient level to protect employment and the nature and character of many of its regions. The difficulties that poisoned relations with Morocco a few years ago involved only a few thousand tonnes of tomatoes; idem for the Italian Parliament's reluctance over oranges. A great issue was made over volumes without comparison to what will be at stake in the next stages of the race to build free-trade areas. In cases of this kind, the Commission tends to speak of "compensation" for European farmers, as if it did not understand that Europe does not need to pay farmers to produce less and less. On the contrary, it needs to produce citrus fruit and olives, tomatoes and grapes if it hopes to avoid an ecological disaster, desertification of part of its territory, impoverishment of the continent's biodiversity, a lack of territorial balance and the death of thousand-year-old landscapes and traditions. There are signs that the Commission seems to be beginning to understand the necessity of protecting its agriculture, if it does indeed propose the abolition of the intervention mechanism for rice, which would be replacedt with higher import duties. The significance of this new position is clear: instead of storing Community rice and eating imported rice, it is better to import less and consume more European rice. A similar negotiation is being announced for garlic, which is not tremendous but could be the sign of a trend. We are aware that such a policy (running counter to the mythical globalisation) is being resisted by all the European farmers who find it more convenient to produce for storage (at a cost to the Community budget) than for the market. But the dignity of the institutions resides in their capacity to resist pressure groups.
Additional sacrifices in European agricultural production would be comprehensible if they offered real advantages to developing export countries. But this is not the case, and here too the tendency must be reversed: these countries must no longer be encouraged to produce for the European market (to the sole benefit of the multinationals that dominate trade and a few large landowners, or even local politicians) but to feed their people, in order gradually to reduce food dependence, which inevitably leads to a dependence not only economic, but also political and cultural.
We have already said so, but sometimes repetita juvant: it is absurd and ruinous for humanity for world agricultural trade to be organised on the basis of exports to the European market (which seems to be the essential aim of the new WTO agricultural negotiations), when the EU accounts for only around 5% of the world's inhabitable land and population. This negligible fraction of the planet is overfed, not underfed, as opposed to billions of humans suffering from under-nourishment, who need to be taught to produce food to feed themselves.
The Mediterranean countries should engage in reflection. The Mediterranean third countries should not neglect the risks they could be taking by opening up their frontiers to products from the European food industry. This is an analysis that needs to be conducted and would be very instructive. The first information about the effects of opening the Mexican market to the United States' agri-foods industry (under the North American Free Trade Agreement) is showing a gradual disappearance of local production, especially dairy production. We refer readers to the recent comments by Isabelle Delforge, for more on this problem in general (Isabelle Delforge is the author of "Nourrir le monde ou l'agrobusiness?", published by Oxfam-Solidarité. She told Le Soir on 4 May: "The timebomb is the model of agriculture imposed on the South by Northern industrialists for over 20 years: it leads to the bankruptcy, sooner or later, of the farming economies of the South. As soon as local crops have been replaced with improved varieties from northern countries, with the chemical inputs they require, farmers are caught up in a endless spiral and neglect their own local research in an effort to improve varieties through hybridisation (...). The agri-foods stakes and strategic choices being discussed today will have an impact going far beyond the health of citizens, in the North and South alike. This is a societal choice with tremendous political repercussions for future generations, more directly in the South, where 50 to 60% of the population is in farming and depends on its plot of land for its daily survival.").
As for industry... According to certain sources, the authorities of the Mediterranean countries are beginning to wonder about the consequences of the free-trade area on their fragile industries. Irrespective of transitional precautions and temporary derogations, the finish line is still the total opening of markets. But some of these countries have already observed that competition from the industrially better organised and technologically more advanced countries leads to an alarming phenomenon: the rapid transformation of small producers into small importers. Those who only recently were gradually building a fabric of SMEs are being transformed into a network of distributors of imported products: and the industrial fabric is coming unravelled. Doubts about the repercussions of the free-trade area were expressed in a study conducted by Egyptian, Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian experts, and these same doubts were the subject of an appeal by several organisations (See EUROPE of 21 April, page 16). The Egyptian government is still hesitating over the signature of the new agreement negotiated with the EU, not, like earlier, in the hope of getting a few more concessions for agricultural exports, but because it is concerned about its nascent industry.
What is important today is not agreement with or rejection of our comments, but a commitment without delay and without preconceived ideas to engage in reflection upon the future. An initiative along these lines has already been taken by "Friends of the Earth-Middle East", with the backing of Globe EU, Friends of the Earth-Europe, Friends of the Earth-Mednet and other organisations. These are not fanatical ecologists. The conference they held recently in Brussels was not limited to taking the environmental considerations into effect, but discussed all aspects -in particular the social impact- of the proposal for the Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area. The Commission and European Parliament participated in the work, along with representatives of certain national parliaments and governments. The aforementioned study by experts from several Mediterranean countries denounced in particular some already foreseeable risks concerning pressure on water resources and the increase in pollution caused by transport and industrialisation in regions not equipped to deal with these phenomena.
We shall foresee an objection right away. There is no comparison possible with the situation in the Central and Eastern European countries that are applicants for accession, because the latter must accept and apply all Community provisions, notably concerning the environment and internal market. For countries without the goal of accession, conditions are radically different. There is a need for considerable reflection, on both sides, going beyond recklessness and the demagogy of the past.
Ferdinando Riccardi