I am expressing a personal opinion: only Jacques Delors is today in a position to express a coherent and comprehensive view of the situation in the European Union. He can do so because he has a vision of Europe (which is lacking among most current authorities), as he has an incredible capacity of synthesis and because his situation, free of any institutional role, enables him to express his opinions without being tied by any "duty to show restraint". Even for those not sharing one or other of his opinions, it is instructive to listen to what he has to say.
In Paris, on 5 April, he indulged in this exercise of synthesis before the Delegation for the European Union in the Senate of the French Republic, meeting jointly with the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. We publish below the text of his speech, which was in response to the invitation of the delegation's Chairman, Mr Xavier de Villepin, to talk on reform of the institutions, enlargement eastward and Europe's "ultimate borders", the construction of the Europe of security and defence. (FR).
I: INTRODUCTORY SPEECH
I hope I will be forgiven for being simplistic at times, provocative even. Before broaching the questions you have raised, I would like to make some brief remarks on the state of the Union.
Three factors that inspire optimism.
The launch of a defence policy is the first, especially as it's a question of a Franco-British initiative, which proves that the British Government does, as it assures us, really want to be "at the heart of Europe". This initiative was so positioned as to circumvent issues that divide, like the relationship with NATO. The aim is to have a projection force which, under conditions yet to be determined, may be employed in peacekeeping or peace-reestablishment tasks, or of support (the importance of the European Union in humanitarian and technical assistance also needs recalling).
Then, the European Council of Lisbon marked a raising of awareness regarding the Balkans. European and international action in this area goes through a multitude of institutions, between which it is high time to avoid double usage. We must know what we want: if it's peace, then better to take the model of the ECSC than multiply structures.
Finally, the economic and social resolution adopted in Lisbon is on the right track, even though, in some ways, it is a belated extension of the 1993 "White Paper", which, even then, placed emphasis on Europe's delay in information technologies. It is interesting to see that, in the economic and social field, we are seeking new methods of governance: the directive is not suited to it, simple dialogue is not enough.
But I must also mention three fears.
A bureaucratic reform
The first concerns the functioning of the institutions. It remains opaque: even a well-educated citizen cannot follow the long path of a text in the meanderings of the decision-making process. Especially, the "institutional triangle" does not work satisfactorily. The "General Affairs" Council (GAC) does not play its role of arbitrator and of preparing the meetings of the European Council, which tend to resemble those of the G8. Regarding this, the reform of the GAC launched in Helsinki is a false reform, a reform of officials. To resolve this problem, the GAC should now be composed of deputy prime ministers with authority - I take this formula on board although some nuances will need providing - so as to impose a reduction to the number of texts. Some 104 draft directives must be submitted to the European Parliament this year; that's much too many and shows that subsidiarity is not being respected. As for the Assembly of Strasbourg, it is seeking its style following its masterstroke against the previous Commission. In Council, majority voting is losing
ground: in the absence of leadership, as no country wants to be placed in a minority, the moment of the vote is deferred and, through that, decision-taking. But are we not moving towards a de facto neo-functionalism, as the European Council has promoted itself, in a certain way, to the rank of the Union's economic and social government. It is difficult not to see in this a blow for the "Community method"; in making this remark, I do not mean to affirm that the latter should be exclusive. I remain in favour of a compromise between Community method and intergovernmental method, as long as there is an ability to decide and to have decisions implemented.
My second fear concerns Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Unlike what happens in the United States, within EMU there is no balance between the economic pole and the political pole. Indeed, Euro 11 cannot take decisions. This imbalance does not conform to the spirit of the Treaty. Are we in an area of competition, or dumping? For my part, I believe it necessary that there should be a balance between competition and cooperation, which presupposes political weight. One has also to mention the problem of prudential control. The phenomena of large scale concentrations and financial movements are developing and comprise risks of bankruptcy: yet, prudential authorities remain national. In addition, the problem of the representation of the "Euro zone" abroad has not been settled.
Finally, a third fear relates to the balance between East and South. At the European Council of Essen, the choice was right not to sacrifice the South for the East, and several Member states - the Mediterranean countries, Great Britain, France - went along these lines. Where do we stand today? I want to believe in the significance of the Euro-African "Summit", but the Community's Mediterranean policy does not seem to be a match for the stakes.
The myth of "unifying enlargement"
I have turned to certain elements of the context. What are the Union's priorities today? The main task is to reunify Europe, and I repeat here that the question of the Union's contours seems to me to be somewhat hollow. In 1992 already, the Commission had stressed that first the institutions needed sorting out: this approach was dropped in favour of a rush forward. Whatever, the affectio societatis seems more important to me than geography.
Enlargement raises the problem of numbers. "Round the table discussions" among twenty-seven seems unthinkable: already among fifteen, ministers no longer listen to their colleagues. New methods are essential.
The state of the economies of the applicant countries must seriously be taken into account. Depending on the country, the per capita GDP represents 20 to 50% of the Community average, only one reaching the last figure. What will become of common policies? The means released for "Agenda 2000" will not be enough to maintain them.
In addition, the heterogeneity of societies is a real challenge for the European social model; the political concerns of the countries of central Europe themselves must also be heard. In short, we are passing off as a motorway what in fact is a path strewn with potholes.
A genuine explanation is required. We live on the myth of a unifying enlargement. Already, at the time of the last enlargement, certain new Member States showed very little interest in the political dimension of European construction. To believe that we shall remain effortlessly in the spirit of the founding fathers seems naive to me. We are therefore faced with choices, and that's the sense of my proposal for a "federation of nation-states". Why these words? Between the two wars, movements for Europe tended to see in the nation a factor of war, that needed surpassing. That's not my opinion. The nation remains a framework of belonging which retains all its necessity within globalisation. At the same time, the powers of each need setting in the Treaty; yet, only a federal approach allows one to define who does what; exclusive powers of the Union, exclusive powers of States, and shared powers that need reducing as far as possible; it is this way that I defend federalism, that I do not conceive ideologically.
So I come now to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). It seems to me that the governments are convinced that there will be an IGC before the end of the enlargement process. Whence, no one is any longer thinking of deciding on everything in this one.
On the three Amsterdam questions, I am close to the position expressed by Mr. Haenel in his article in the Figaro. But, in the final analysis, these questions cannot be separated from a more fundamental one: what is it we want to do together?
On enhanced cooperation, the current mechanism cannot work. In any case, can we really envisage that option as a remedy to all our difficulties? It takes eight countries to launch enhanced cooperation. Are we going to see a group of eight launch cooperation in the field of taxation, another on the environment, another on social affairs? Where would Europe be in this "take-your-pick" atmosphere and who could manage it?
On the drawing up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights, I note that the exercise is doing well. The involvement of the national parliaments is positive. There is a lesson to be learnt here. But the status of the Charter remains in suspense. Will it be compulsory? How will the judgments of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts tie in with it? We need to realise that if the Charter contains social rights as foreseen, its incorporation into the Treaty will lead to a further transfer of competences, to which I am opposed, because I believe that social issues must essentially remain the competence of States. Seeing this exercise as the first step towards a Constitution could be going a bit too fast. At the risk of seeming old fashioned, I must say that I still believe it is the Treaty that is the appropriate mode for governing relations between sovereign States.
It is not too late to launch the avant-garde proposal
In my article in Le Monde, I called for a geopolitical approach to the question of enlargement. Globalisation calls for an effort to establish regulation. A Europe of 30 or 32 could be a laboratory for this undertaking. It can constitute a large economic area with rules, an example for the global level. Clearly, this point of view is not hostile to enlargement. But what becomes of plans for a political Europe in that case? This is why I am pleading for an avant-garde, but I would stress that this is an open avant-garde, excluding no one willing and able to comply with its responsibilities. I have been told that it is too late: this is not so. Is it ever too late to do things correctly? I have also been told that no movement in this direction is being seen in the States: but is it not time for the founding countries to launch such a movement? Another objection brought up is that this option would be too complicated. The idea of creating a "treaty within the treaty" frightens some. So be it: something more flexible can be considered. We should remember that the Treaty of Rome contained a "Benelux clause", because the rapprochement by the three countries concerned was at the time going further on certain points than the Treaty of Rome.
In any event, I would like to stress once again how worrying it would be to allow the European Council and the institutional triange to be uncoupled. Bringing them closer together must be a priority."
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NOTE: This text is taken from "Actualités de la délégation pour l'Union européenne du Sénat français", No 34, Ordinary Session 1999-2000. The subtitles were added by Agence EUROPE.
Tomorrow we shall reproduce part two, containing Jacques Delors' responses to the questions put to him during the hearing.