Looking beyond euro worries. As the New Year opens, it is only logical for attention to focus on the ups and downs and difficulties pertaining to the euro: which remains the top story. However, in reality, it is the future of the European Union, in all its essential aspects, that is at stake in 2012. In addition to determining what lies ahead for the euro (involving the hotly debated Intergovernmental Treaty to be defined in a matter of weeks), a choice must be made between the different possible steps forward. These entail:
consolidation of the EU as a compact whole or the birth of a two-speed Europe;
continued enlargement to many countries that are more or less officially candidates to accession (including the prospect of EU membership for Turkey, Ukraine, etc), or a more cautious enlargement policy;
the definition of financial perspectives for the period 2014-2020, an explosive issue which above all involves the matter of net contributor countries, and the British rebate (unless there is a miraculous breakthrough with regard to own resources);
and institutional procedures including clarification of the Community method and the intergovernmental method and several other aspects, including essential cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments (given the power that the latter wield in budgetary matters).
These different issues are closely linked to each other and their evolution will largely determine what the future holds. Positions sometimes differ radically from one member state to the next, and discrepancies, at first sight technical, underpin the fundamental aspects of the future EU. Furthermore, it is often practically impossible to determine who is right and who is wrong, as we all have our reasons for the stances we take, but those reasons are sometimes contradictory, as can be seen by the “two speed” hypothesis, which albeit inevitable for some, is unacceptable for others.
The “financial perspective” entanglement. The new financial perspectives are a prime example of inescapable differences. Already back in September 2011, eight member states had signed a joint statement affirming a simple principle ruling out any increase in Community spending over the 2014-2020 period. The statement was signed by the net contributor countries, those who pay into the EU budget more than they receive from it: Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom (in alphabetical order). They are aware that they will remain net contributors in the future, but with a budget unchanged - as the EU must spend better, not more. This development since September logically strengthened the orientation taken by the signatory countries, as they must step up their efforts to rebalance their national expenditure. One might ask whether member states that are currently net beneficiaries of the Community budget have evaluated the impact of the future enlargements that they support. All candidate countries, without exception, will also become net beneficiaries, which will imply changes in current criteria and calculation. For example, accession (fortunately hypothetical) by Turkey and Ukraine would entail a shift in the criteria that must be met to receive European support.
Caution is needed in assessing certain applications for EU membership that seem essentially motivated by the funding expected from the EU and by access to the Schengen area, objectives that do not justify participation in Community institutions. There are roads other than accession that could be explored.
Institutional divergence should not be over-dramatised. The institutional chapter, also, comprises elements likely to largely determine the way European construction develops. The disagreement of principle between the Community method and the intergovernmental method could be partly de-dramatised, as, I believe, there are misunderstandings that should be clarified. Doctrinal uncertainty has an effect on the daily working of the Union. To take a purely theoretical example: what attitude would the European Commission adopt if the half-yearly rotation of the Council Presidency had attributed this role to the Hungarian government, as Barroso reproaches the latter for its decisions deemed incompatible with Community rules, and given that the Hungarian prime minister's rejoinder to this is simply that “no one can intervene in the legislative process” of his country? And supposing laws contested in Brussels were adopted in Budapest? Not forgetting that the European Parliament is taking a stance in plenary on the programme of all new Council presidencies. Fortunately, this example is theoretical and the reality, with its Danish president of the EU Council, is quite a different matter. But it could still happen.
My musings on the prospects that the New Year holds will continue tomorrow.
(FR/transl.jl)