My comments made yesterday about the differences between the European Commission and the European Council with regard to the respective roles in eurozone management require a few more considerations about certain attitudes of the protagonists.
In need of a president. According to Guy Verhofstadt, the leader of the Liberal group in the European Parliament, the eurozone currently has a “plethora of leaders” (or different leadership candidates) when what in fact is needed is clear direction. Like the great majority of the Parliament, he considers that this task should go to the European Commission. He spells out a radical formula: the merger of the presidencies of the Commission and European Council, which would resolve the problem at its source because this dual president would obviously be at the head of the eurozone. Is this too easy to achieve? Probably, and all the more so as Mr Barroso indicated that the Commission intends to propose (by using its right of initiative) that the eurozone have a single representation in international bodies, instead of being represented by the member states.
Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy were just as clear as Mr Barroso but they went in the opposite direction. They proposed that the president of the European Council, Mr Van Rompuy, become in practice Mr Euro, by taking charge of “European economic government”, an objective that is now unavoidable given that the economic dimension of EMU has finally been made concrete and the rules on how it operates will soon be in force, whilst waiting for its tasks to be further strengthened and expanded. For Mr Barroso, however, does this kind of economic government correspond to the Commission itself?
A simple role for Van Rompuy or two jobs rolled into one? It appears, nevertheless, that not all member states agree on the Merkel-Sarkozy formula. Obviously, at the level of heads of state and government the role of Mr Van Rompuy is not up for discussion: when the European Council is tackling eurozone affairs it is Van Rompuy who presides over discussions. But how do matters stand when it is at the level of the finance ministers, in other words the Eurogroup, which is presided over by Jean-Claude Juncker? Certain member states do not want the presidency at both these levels.
What does Mr Van Rompuy think? At the beginning of last month, he announced that he was prepared to accept a second mandate at the head of the European Council and indicated that this possible extension might also cover “specific eurozone functions”. Last week, however, he appeared more reticent and expressed a number of concerns about a single presidency at the two levels. Mr Verhofstadt, who is never short on ideas, launched the idea of a European super-commissioner who would be in charge of the national finance ministries: in practice, this would be the European minister of finance.
The British problem gets worse. The factor that is becoming more and more difficult in all this is the coherence between developments in the eurozone and the line taken by the United Kingdom. The most important initiatives that are taken, announced or planned in Brussels often meet opposition from London. When this involves measures applicable to the EU as a whole, agreement from the United Kingdom is often necessary (even though, sometimes, the majority voting rule applies at the Council). The BBA, the British Bankers' Association, has approached the European Commission (with a letter to Michel Barnier) to express its concerns and reservations. The government of Mr Cameron has assured the BBA of its support. Anything that smacks of introducing rules into the area of derivative products is not to London's taste, for the simple reason that the vast majority of operations involving these products are carried out in the City. The reform being discussed in Brussels would lead to spectacular damage to these operations. Compromise could have been reached for some aspects. My objective, however, is not to tackle the technical aspects, which are beyond my ken, but to point out once again that British participation in European integration is in fact diminishing it. The United Kingdom does not participate in the Schengen area or the single currency and it will not be taking part in the planned European military cooperation. It is also opposed to the tax on financial transactions, which is vital for resolving the budgetary crisis in the EU and member states. If it is opposed to any attempt to exert control over the world of finance, the situation just gets worse.
Overcoming systematic pessimism. One final remark: despite the differences between the institutions, the concerns of public opinion, the misgivings of certain member states, the progress and the backtracking, despite all this, European integration is making progress. The areas covered by the EU are increasing. The EP having powers of decision, the single currency, the Schengen area - these were all just dreams and hypotheses once but are now a reality. When will Europeans get over this period of systematic pessimism?
(FR/transl.fl)