Substantial agreement. In the huge area of economic governance are the differences between member states, and between some of the member states and the Community institutions and bodies, as pronounced as some of the media claim? I believe that by almost exclusively emphasising the aspects that are still controversial, we forget what really counts. The essential issue is that after several months of discussions, the taskforce presided over by Herman Van Rompuy has produced a text approved by all members of the group (notwithstanding a minor exception, which is highlighted in the following paragraph) which covers most of the problems, including some of the difficulties that just a few weeks ago appeared almost unsurmountable. Although misgivings and misunderstandings still persist, this positive evolution has not been underlined. Obviously, seeking consensus implies compromise and the nature of any compromise naturally means each different party abandons some of the elements contained in its original position. The superficial idea that only divergences are a subject of interest should not be applied to problems upon which the future of Europe and its citizens depend.
A spectacular reservation. The reservation expressed by Jean-Claude Trichet is quite spectacular, due to his role as president of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the media attention surrounding him. Herman Van Rompuy (or his colleagues?) has in my opinion been a little naïve in his hope of playing down Trichet's reservation. It does not figure in the text of the report nor in the margins but in the list of the group members: an asterisk appears after Mr Trichet's name, suggesting the following small print is read: “the president of the ECB does not adhere to all elements contained in this report” (EUROPE 10237). This is an ineffectual precaution because Mr Trichet was in charge of the visibility of his position himself, by way of several declarations made in Frankfurt and elsewhere. His reservation essentially focuses on one point: according to the Franco-German declaration, sanctions against member states that do not respect the rules of the updated Stability Pact are not totally automatic. They are preceded by a vote at the Council by majority voting, noting the shortcomings. After which, if there is no redress in the following six months by the member state in question, sanctions will become automatic. This is a compromise between Germany, which is in favour of as automatic an approach to sanctions as possible, and France, which wants to safeguard the political prerogatives of the Council (therefore, of the member states themselves). Is the divergence between Mr Trichet and the political authorities as glaring as the media try to make out? We have to wonder. The significant enhancement of the Stability Pact (EUROPE 10241) has come about through the expansion of the range of controls and sanctions, as well as the speeding up of supervisory procedures for national budgets. The number of new rules is impressive and the institutions will not be content to wait for the data to be sent them by the member states. The European Commission and the ECB will be able to carry out missions in the field.
It is normal that Mr Trichet has concerns about procedures but in the new context, the fear of majority voting leading to sanctions being blocked appears to be rather theoretical.
A difficult revision. I do not believe that the reservation expressed by Mr Trichet should hinder the results of this week's European Council. The real sizeable difference exists elsewhere and involves the main elements in the Franco-German declaration, namely the revision of the Lisbon Treaty with its two objectives: the creation of the new permanent crisis management mechanism to replace the current mechanism which expires in 2013, and the possibility of political sanctions (suspension of voting rights) against member states that do not respect the updated Stability Pact. Yesterday, our publication contained a report on the objections expressed by several member states with regard to the possibility of revising the treaty. These are threefold: an unrealistic timetable; the probability that another government may request further amendments; the impression that Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy have presented the other member states with a fait accompli (neither the president of the European Council nor the Belgian presidency of the Council had been informed in advance). A reference to simplified revision procedure, included in the Lisbon Treaty, was opportune but it is not enough to overcome the misgivings expressed by several member states nor, especially, the sharp response given by the European Parliament.
This week, the summit will be able to pave the way for the first European budgetary semester (on 1 January next) and launch a process for deepening the Stability Pact. This is already a lot. Nonetheless, it will not be mentioning revision of the treaty or the new anti-crisis instrument. These will be subjects for next spring.
(F.R./transl.fl)