Unsatisfactory situation. The way in which the EU is managing the issue of possible Turkish accession is raising a lot of concerns. It is almost exclusively tackling partial aspects of the question, which are undoubtedly important but rarely decisive and sometimes ephemeral. Consequently, it is leaving aside the most fundamental question of all: is this accession desirable and appropriate? There are obvious reasons for not asking this question: there is no uniform member state position on the question and therefore an EU response as such is impossible. Countries in favour of Turkish accession, as well as Turkey itself, underline commitments made in the past (which should be recognised and which were explicit). Member states which are opposed to or have misgivings about the country's accession consider that the situation is no longer the same and that certain texts have changed in meaning. The result is that every year, the European Commission carries out a detailed analysis on the chapter-by-chapter negotiations, as well as developments in Turkey itself. The debate at the Council focuses on one or other examples of progress made or existing blockages, including certain aspects of behaviour demonstrated by the Turkish authorities. The number of chapters, however, being negotiated is very limited and is not progressing. The most sensitive chapters have not yet been tackled. Questions which have been resolved are in fact relatively minor ones and have already been settled in the framework of Euro-Turkish relations. The slow progress and uncertainties are justified by underlining the fact that there is no hurry because, in any case, accession is a remote objective: 15 years? Perhaps more? This is an unsatisfactory situation.
Turkey will not wait indefinitely. Instead of quarrelling about one or other of the Turkish government's initiatives or about such and such an attitude displayed by the parliament in Ankara or ruling of a court, the EU should clarify what the repercussions of accession will be. From this point of view, the EU is found wanting. The behaviour of the Turkish authorities is often balanced and courageous. Their positions with regard to the Kurdish problem have evolved in a positive fashion (and caused ructions within the national parliament). Its official positions on the lines adopted by some of the reticent member states are both dignified and cautious. Prime Minister Erdogan explained that his country would not wait indefinitely for the EU to decide on its candidacy; the minister for foreign affairs explicitly affirmed in an interview to a Spanish newspaper that Turkey is not prepared to wait as long as Spain had to (seven years before France withdrew its reservations).
Evaluate the repercussions. It is up to the EU to clarify its intentions and pose a number of preliminary but fundamental questions regarding the domestic repercussions of Turkish accession. According to current rules, Turkey: - would have the highest number of seats at the European Parliament and carry the most weight at the Council with regard to decisions made at majority voting; - would have the right to receive a significant segment of funding from the common agricultural policy and take up most of the resources from cohesion policy, which would remove several EU regions from the current list of zones eligible for Community support. The deepening of common European policies, particularly with regard to foreign and security policy, would become subject to question because Turkey is directly involved in questions involving Asia and in which the EU should not directly intervene. Should it therefore be concluded that Turkish accession is practically incompatible with the way in which the EU functions according to the Lisbon Treaty? Is it incompatible with maintaining the CAP and cohesion policy?
The EU must at least ask itself these questions and examine these dossiers.
Hidden intentions? Everything could change if the EU shifted in the direction advocated, in particular, by Guy Verhofstadt: the setting up of a hard-core, or (to use the term used by Jacques Delors again) “differentiation” between member states. This differentiation, in fact, already exists for: the single currency, the scrapping of border controls (Schengen area) and the obligatory character of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Would it be possible to envisage differentiated treatment with regard to agricultural and cohesion policies? Or should the EU abandon some of its common policies as they currently exist and move towards the European Commission's famous draft document which provoked so many negative responses and which has for the time being been put on the backburner? This is not the direction sought by the majority of Community players or by most member states, but it has not been ruled out that certain supporters of Turkish accession are in fact aiming to put an end to certain aspects of common policies and the principle of Community solidarity. A real debate about Turkey's accession would help clarify this matter.
(F.R./transl.fl)