On Tuesday, the Lisbon Treaty enters into force and the EU becomes more democratic and efficient. We need to be realistic: citizens are not very were aware of this fact. Procedures are changing, Parliament's powers are increasing and opportunities for grassroots initiatives exist but all this is not exactly going to set the popular imagination on fire. The institutions understand this and last Wednesday's debate in Strasbourg was dominated by the observation that the institutional debate does not in itself respond to citizens' expectations. Their concerns focus more upon the economic crisis, employment, climate change and internal security (EUROPE 10027). This column has already referred to this matter (EUROPE 10025). In his acceptance speech on 19 November, after having underlined the scope of the new framework introduced, Mr Van Rompuy, affirmed: “the institutional debate is closed for a long period”.
Although institutional innovation cannot in itself capture the popular imagination of European citizens, it is, nonetheless, an indispensable ingredient for the EU if it is to function efficiently in domains in which it has a remit. Strengthening democracy and transparency is essential. Innovation involves both the European Parliament and the national parliaments. Today, I will simply refer to this twofold aspect; many other elements will undoubtedly be mentioned in the official ceremonies tomorrow in Lisbon.
The three areas of the EP's new powers. Enhancing the legislative competencies of the European Parliament is the most spectacular of all the innovations introduced: from now on, almost all EU legislation is defined by the Parliament and Council on an equal footing. The terminology itself has changed and this system of equal treatment is no longer called co-decision procedure but ordinary legislative procedure. It applies to areas where, until yesterday, the EP did not have genuine powers and had to restrict itself to resolutions or methods for reaching positions on: energy, space, humanitarian assistance, civil protection and tourism. If there is a disagreement between the EP and the Council, a new conciliation procedure is introduced.
The second area involves budgetary powers: the distinction between non-obligatory spending (on which the EP and Council already decided together) and obligatory expending (on which the EP previously had no voice and which covered, in particular, the common agricultural policy) now disappears. The Parliament and Council now have to reach a decision together on all of the budget. MEPs previously had no control at all on the multi-annual financial framework. From now on, it will be approved by way of a specific procedure: a decision by the Council at unanimity, following approval at the EP. Decisions on the EP's future own resources will now be decided by member states (because they alone can choose whether to transfer one other form of revenue to the EU). Execution measures, however, will also be adopted by the Council (by qualified majority), following approval by the Parliament. The president of the European Commission (who maintains the exclusive right of initiative) has said that he is prepared to work jointly with the EP in the reflection on the future revision of current own resources. This commitment was made by Mr Barroso at the request of Alain Lamassoure, the president of the parliamentary budgets committee. Conciliation procedure between the Parliament and Council has also been revised through setting up a conciliation committee in the event of disagreement.
The third area involves the EP's institutional powers. The EP itself elects the president of the Commission, based on a proposal from the European Council, and the College is submitted to a vote of approval. This vote also covers the vice president who will at the same time take on the role of the high representative for foreign policy and the stable president of the External Relations Council.
More involvement from national parliaments. The protocol on the role of these parliaments includes three areas: a) all EU legislative drafts are sent to the national parliaments at the same time as the EP and Council, and the deadline for examination is set at eight weeks instead of six b); in practice, national parliaments become the guardians for ensuring subsidiarity, by way of an early warning mechanism ( if a third of national parliaments deem that an EU draft does not comply with the subsidiarity principle, the European Commission is obliged to re-examine it); c) the mechanism for controlling subsidiarity and proportionality is strengthened because national parliaments can now issue a reasoned opinion, whereby the Commission draft is either re-examined or withdrawn. If the Commission draft is maintained, a special procedure is applied which also involves the European legislator (Parliament and Council), together with the national parliaments. This can also be taken to the European Court of Justice.
(F.R./transl.fl)