The top priority. José Manuel Barroso does not believe that one commissioner per member state will harm the way the European Commission works. He is not opposed to a smaller Commission, but he points out that most small and medium-sized member states are not prepared to give up having a commissioner of their nationality permanently within the College. This position is understandable, especially from Central and Eastern European member states which have only relatively recently regained their freedom, independence and identity. There are well-known slogans of the “We've just broken free from Moscow, we don't want to fall into Brussels' grasp” type. From the start, the Commission was, for them, the most obvious part of the EU: it negotiated accessions and monitored compliance with Community rules. Having a European commissioner of their nationality is sometimes, in the eyes of their peoples, the symbol of being part of how Europe is run. This should not be overlooked, especially by those who, as is the case with Mr Barroso, believe that “the Commission can operate effectively even with a greater number of commissioners” and that present experience and a number of independent studies prove it to be so.
This column has already stressed that the real danger does not lie in the number of commissioners, but in the rotation system based on the principle of equality contained in the Lisbon Treaty, along with the possibility of its being reviewed. The egalitarian nature of the rotation system is absurd, given, in particular, the fragmentation, already witnessed or expected, in some member states or applicant countries. The return to the one commissioner per member state principle would mean the rotation system based on the principle of equality would be laid to rest. That was the top priority. It is, then, perfectly fair to agree with Mr Barroso: “I do not believe that the number of commissioners is the real issue” (see the interview with Mr Barroso in our newsletter No 9829), but with certain conditions.
Avoiding voting. First condition: the hypothesis of some 30 commissioners can only be sustained if the Commission does not vote by simple majority. Simple majority voting when member states representing around 90% of the population, the economic activity and the wealth of the EU have only a handful of the votes available would make no sense. It is true that commissioners represent, not their countries of origin, but the general European interest. But, if nationality is not important, why is each country fiercely fighting to retain “its” commissioner?
In fact, the Barroso Commission has never voted, and it is unlikely to do so in its remaining months. Observers point to two examples: Mr Mandelson prepared a review of EU anti-dumping policy and Mr McCreevy drafted a number of financial projects. Several other commissioners felt these initiatives were unwanted or inappropriate. Mr Barroso got them to give up their plans, making the announcement themselves. Every time a plan is controversial, the president calls for account to be taken of the reasons behind other commissioners' reservations and to reflect their objections in the text, even when there is a clear majority in favour. This type of action assumes a strong Presidency and retention of the collegial nature of the Commission.
A Vice-Presidency to be clarified. Once the Lisbon Treaty comes into effect, it will bring another sensitive issue to the fore: the inclusion within the Commission of a vice-president responsible to the Council for the main part of what he/she does. We know: the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy will, at one and the same time, be the vice-president of the Commission and the president of the Foreign Affairs Councils. He/she will be appointed by the European Council, which will be able to terminate his/her mandate. The post will bring together the functions that are currently shared among three players: the president of the Foreign Affairs Council, the external relations commissioner and the high representative already in office. The incumbent will have the right of initiative in the area of the CFSP, will represent the EU in dealings with third countries (Kissinger's telephone number) and in international organisations, will have considerable financial means at his/her disposal and will conduct the European External Action Service, the composition and operation of which are still under discussion. Let us not beat about the bush: everyone welcomes these attempts to make things clearer and more effective which will transform the way the EU foreign policy is run and operates, but no one can predict what will happen on the ground. How can this revolution be prevented from eroding the Commission's independence from the inside?
This is not a pressing issue, because it depends on the Lisbon Treaty coming into effect. However, issues related to the forthcoming elections are urgent. In this area there is great ferment. We will return to it.
(F.R./transl.rt)