Double advantage. The arguments made in this column (EUROPE 9781) to explain the conviction that Turkish accession to the EU does not represent the appropriate solution for either party, have been contested by a number of readers. It is, above all, the Turkish academic world that has responded. The authorities in Ankara are keeping quiet, which is logical because their position is well-known and is expressed on a daily basis in the framework of ongoing negotiations. The observations that have been made have a double advantage: a far-reaching knowledge of the situation which places the discussion at a high level; and the generally courteous tone which is far removed from any demagogy or anathema that often characterise the political debate. There is nothing surprising about the disagreements expressed, they were expected and I would not talk about them if I did not get the impression that we are confronting a fundamental debate about the future of European construction.
Without prospects for accession, are negotiations a waste of time? The most radical position is that of Mahir Ilgaz, a researcher at the Economic Development Foundation. He believes that without accession prospects, his country would no longer have any reason to negotiate. Everything that has been achieved over the years, including the customs union, has been accomplished by common agreement in this connection; if the EU now rejects Turkey, it will not respect its commitments. As for the risk of Turkey's entry into the EU destabilising the Lisbon Treaty, Mr Ilgaz does not see how this treaty could be made more unstable than it already is.
Some Europeans rightly believe that this treaty ought to be saved and propitiously applied. Turkish accession in the absence of the planned institutional revision in the Lisbon Treaty would involve the watering down of the EU into a weaker whole. This is, indeed, the aim of certain European political forces, but it is not in my case. I am, fortunately, not alone in believing in an integrated Europe. I am not going to talk about whether Turkish motivation is exclusively linked to the prospect of joining the Union. I consider that certain reforms are, in any case, timely and desirable, whether accession does or does not happen, but it is up to Turkey itself to decide on this.
Institutional weight. Cisel Ileri, senior researcher on EU-Turkish relations, does not dispute that as a member state his country would have considerable weight within the European institutions, but this does not mean the power to determine Community decisions. Germany is currently the most powerful member at the EP and at the Council but this does not mean it exerts any kind of supremacy. No institution and almost no MEP would overtly formulate this remark, but how can we ignore the fact that Germany is the biggest gross contributor to the Community budget and is the most economically and financially powerful European player? The weight that results from this is pragmatically justified. For Turkey, a similar or even greater weight (due to demographic trends) would be, perhaps, less well understood by European public opinion.
Energy dossier. Mr Ileri also points out that Nabucco is a European project and it would be positive for the EU if the country where this is routed (or at least a big part of it), becomes a member state. Should one therefore consider that the EU ought to seek the accession of all countries that transit its energy imports? Why not, therefore, envisage the accession of countries that provide the gas and oil? I believe that clear agreements and solid reciprocal commitments are necessary. They are, in fact, envisaged with, Russia, in particular, but accession involves other criteria and other conditions. Turkey should closely examine the potential constraints implied by accession for its energy industry: submission to non-discriminatory Community rules, the obligation of accepting Commission decisions and if needs be, decisions by the European Court of Justice etc.
Regional and agricultural funding. According to Ilke Toygur, junior researcher at the Economic Development Foundation, the argument that Turkey would hinder the EU's democratic functioning, independence and freedom of action, is provocative. The problem is that I never asserted anything of the sort because I do not believe it. His observation that Turkish accession to Community funding would be slow and gradual with a subsequently reasonable effect on the EU's finances, is even more interesting. This is an astute observation. How many years, however, will be needed for Anatolia and other regions to reach the income levels necessary for avoiding the double and automatic effect of participating in Regional Funds and other Community instruments? Much of the funding would rightfully go to these Turkish regions, and EU zones currently covered by this funding would no longer be so except by way of increasing financial allocations to proportions that are difficult to imagine.
Little linkage to accession. Ilke Toygur also touches on more general aspects such as: the opportunity for the EU to have direct access to the Caucasus and Middle East, regions which are extremely important for peace in the world and for energy security; the scale of trade and other economic ties between the EU and Turkey; the positive factor of the EU having the benefit of a young and willing population, which would enable Europe to respond efficiently to the sometimes dramatic decline its population; the competitiveness of the Turkish economy, which is undoubtedly superior to some of the member states in Eastern Europe. At the same time, Ilke Toygur thinks that geographical considerations are secondary and that the principles characterising the EU should not depend on the geographical position of member states. All the aspects he cites are interesting but in my opinion, not very relevant to the question of accession. By following his reasoning, even the USA, Canada and Australia could be accession candidates.
Valid objections from a Turkish point of view. The most sustained surge of objections, however, comes from Cigdem Nas, at the Yildiz Technical University (Istanbul), who completes the points made by Mahir Ilgaz.
To outline these views briefly: a) since 1959, EU-Turkish relations have been based on prospects for accession: Article 28 of the Association Treaty, the European Commission's 1987 opinion on Turkey's request for accession; the European Council declaration of 1999 (“Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union…”), the Commission's 2004 recommendation on opening accession negotiations; b) if a special relationship were suggested now, it would be a denial of Turkey's rightful place in the EU; c) to claim that it is in Turkey's interest to keep its independence and freedom of action, is a euphemism for rejecting its status as a member state. In the modern world, the autonomy and freedom of action of an isolated country does not exist.; d) the “double majority” system for Council decision reduces Turkey's relative weight in Community decision making; e) in the economic arena, the customs union regime has already led Turkey to align much of its legislation and administrative structures on the European model, which means that Turkey has, to a significant extent, abandoned its freedom of action; f) to negotiate accession without the prospect of reaching this goal would be meaningless. Why use EU legislation unless it is in the perspective of joining the European Union?
These comments lead Mr Cigdem Nas to conclude that saying “no” to accession would mean accepting Turkey when it is useful and advantageous to the EU, while excluding it from the decision-making process, which corresponds to Turkey agreeing to European political burdens without being able to contribute to their elaboration. He also illustrates the positive impact Turkish accession would have on the EU's image which could no longer then be defined as an exclusively “Christian club”.
From a European point of view…Cigdem Nas' text constitutes an efficient and valuable description of the Turkish thesis. I still hold the opinion that accession is not the appropriate solution for Turkey itself but it is obviously up to the authorities and the Turkish public to decide on this. If Ankara considers that in the absence of accession prospects, even the customs union represents a burden, the EU should accept this. But I believe from a European point of view that the objections summarised in this column (EUROPE 9781) still stand. The observation that regional policy and the common agricultural policy should be to a large extent demolished, was not actually contested.
Asian problems. I would add that Turkey is confronting some very serious domestic problems, which go further than its borders. It is enough to mention the Kurdish question, which directly involves both Iraq and Iran. Europe can and must help as far as it can to find a solution but from the outside because it is not a European problem, it is an Asian problem linked to Asia's history and geography. In this period where independence has been recognised in Montenegro and Kosovo or proclaimed by Moscow for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, what will the solution be for the Kurds? I haven't the slightest idea. The oil wealth of Iraqi Kurdistan comes on top of the ethnic and cultural demands. Europe is striving to resolve its own similar problems and does not have the right to directly intervene in Asia.
The other hypothesis. It is certain that if the EU intrinsically changes and modifies its goals, and if the integration project fails and it become an inter-governmental entity, it could expand beyond European territory. But in this case, member states that remain loyal to the integration project will pursue it on their own and “differentiation” will become the rule. This is another story and we're not there yet.
(F.R./transl.rh)