The way the IGC (Intergovernmental Conference), at Heads of State and Government level, ended on Saturday evening has so many significant implications that it calls for analysis of all the various aspects, beyond the general considerations unfolded in Sunday's special edition. Sunday's EUROPE contains a summation- which, to the best of my knowledge, is the only one of its kind in world press- of all press conferences and individual reactions by almost all those taking part in the Summit. In its comments on the results, this section is less histrionic than other commentators: I believe that Europe is not redundant, that the Convention's heritage is not lost and that Europe will have its Constitutional Treaty, albeit with a slight delay, and that the events of the coming months will bear me out. Here is a bit more food for thought.
Responsibility for the temporary glitch. The Presidency, most delegations and the European Commission refused to lay the blame with any particular government. Particular care was visibly taken not to point the finger at either Spain or Poland, so that there will still be a chance of overcoming the difficulties. Instead, the consensus which was reached on 90% of the draft was played up. José Maria Aznar took a step towards Germany (keeping the Nice voting system, but raising the German votes from 29 to 31), which was certainly clumsy, but showed the spirit of compromise. He also expressed his confidence in concluding the IGC "in the near future". The Polish authorities underlined their support for the draft Constitution as a whole; the blame for the lack of consensus on one point was to be shared between all, and the quest for a fair compromise must continue.
It must be said, however that certain Heads of Government report an atmosphere which was, in general, very little conducive to overall agreement, expressing regret at the excessive defence of national interests at the cost of European ones (Belgium and Luxembourg made this point strongly), and that Chancellor Gerhard Schröder also made comments to this effect, adding that in the final discussion prior to the press conferences, he had spoken of positive developments. Jacques Chirac spoke of a "certain difference in European culture" between countries with "long experience of Europe" and the others, citing positions on the composition of the Commission as an example of this difference.
Initiatives of a "pioneer group" and two-speed Europe. Only Jacques Chirac seems to have shown any impatience and hoped for the immediate proclamation of swift initiatives. According to the French President, the time to act is here as a pioneer group, open to all, would "give impulsion and set an example". The other leaders thought that it would have been inappropriate to list the differences between groups now, thus giving the impression that it is now impossible to go forward as 25.
At the same time, however, the prospect of a pioneer group has been unmistakably reaffirmed. Gerhard Schröder said that two-speed Europe would be the "logical consequence" of a definitive failure of the IGC, possibly in 2004, adding: "there is no initiative to this end, but I do not rule it out".
The important thing is the number of countries which have expressed their determination to take part in a pioneer group (bearing in mind that this term is neither official nor definitive), not only the founding countries, but also others, including those which will formally join the Union next May. A quick scan of the summary in yesterday's special bulletin shows the unequivocal positions of Hungary and the Czech Republic, to which it seems we may need to add Slovenia, to say nothing of Austria which "obviously" wishes to join the "hardcore". The Czech Minister Cyril Svoboda confirmed that he had been contacted to give position. This is doubtless the attempt, ascribed to Jacques Chirac, at an immediate "declaration", which was considered inappropriate for the time being.
The available information shows that only José Maria Aznar has spoken out against the principle of two-speed Europe, as he feels that nobody wants this turn of events.
Defence European and the significance of the agreement reached. In the final press conference, so much was said of the institutional issues causing the blockage, that the defence dossier went virtually unmentioned. But as early as Saturday morning, when this dossier was resolved, Jacques Chirac stressed its importance and Guy Verhofstadt talked of a "gigantic step" For the details, see our bulletin of 13 December, page 5.
President Jacques Chirac said: "This defence Europe, rejected 40 years ago, impossible a few years ago, will be a very important step towards a political Europe which is capable of playing its part on the international scene (...) We have come away from transatlantic polemic. The decisions we have taken lie in the interests of all, of Europe and of NATO". And having observed that it had not been easy to agree on the last text of this dossier, that of the autonomous European "planning cell", IGC President Silvio Berlusconi said that the text agreed upon "should put paid to the cold spell hitting Europe and the US".
Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt emphasised this planning cell, which is not a permanent headquarters but a "permanent capacity", capable of major developments. He explained that this European civil and military cell (which will be created as soon as possible next year and located on Avenue de Cortenberg, where the EU already has its CFSP offices), will only be activated if NATO does not intend to take on a planned operation, or if the European Union does not intend to do so with NATO means. The EU would then act with its own resources, under the "structured co-operation" anticipated between Member States which wish, and are able, to take part. It will be a cell of reduced dimensions (according to Javier Solana, the hundred or so people already in Cortenberg will be quite enough). But Guy Verhofstadt thinks that it will develop slowly. He said: "I compare this cell for the planning and conduct of common military operations to the European Central Bank. Twenty years ado, we started off with a Monetary Institute, with a degree of ambition which was lower even than that of the military cell. It has grown into the ECB we all know".
How can Tony Blair convince George Bush of the project's acceptability? Doubtless by making the point that if there is no agreement, France, Germany and Belgium will create this "cell" for themselves, without the participation of Great Britain (which would most certainly represent an element of internal balance, for the good of Europe and of the Atlantic Alliance).
The link between the Constitution and the new financial perspectives. Efforts to avoid any link between the negotiations on the Constitution and the preparation of the forthcoming financial perspectives for the "post 2006" period have, in practice, failed. The two negotiations will overlap (the Commission will present proposals on the future financial framework next month). Gerhard Schröder explicitly admitted "a certain parallelism" which "may complicate things even more", and took the opportunity to indicate that Germany would insist that the Community budget will not exceed 1% of Union GDP (the current ceiling, which has, in reality, never been reached, is 1.27%).
The significance of the link obviously centres on the degrees of "Community financial solidarity" in the future. This solidarity has always existed, essentially in the context of economic cohesion. Italy in the Community of Six, then Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, have all benefited from this. But this financial solidarity was always considered a part of overall solidarity, which didn't even need to be defined because it existed de facto, especially in agriculture and, in principle, foreign policy. We saw above that some of the older Member States reproached some of the more recent ones for not having the same view of European interests, and being concerned only by their own national interests. Cynics, and those who consider themselves realists, will no doubt reply that it has always been this way, and that each Member State has always defended its national interests. This is partly true, because no government can disregard its country's interests. But some of them understand better than others to what extent European interests become national interests; for example, reinforcing the institutions and extending majority voting to new areas means giving up extra chunks of sovereignty, but at the same time this makes the Union more efficient, to the benefit of all. And, in particular, how can the existence of financial solidarity be contested? The figures on resources transferred from the richest countries to the less well-off under regional or cohesion policy are there for all to see; and we know how ardently the less well-off fight for this to continue. But this solidarity cannot be isolated; it must be part of a more general attitude, a mindset shared by all. If anybody challenges the principle of solidarity, they should follow this through with logic and give up all financial claims.
The acquis to be rescued. We have been assured by several sources that apart from the two well-known institutional points, all the rest has been resolved. We want to believe it, and hear the gory details, on budgetary procedure for instance (annual budges and pluri-annual financial frameworks). If it is true, and if the solutions agreed upon are positive, they must be consolidated as a matter of urgency, because there were an awful lot more points on which drafting uncertainties subsisted.
(F.R.)