Real overlap. The Lisbon Treaty has created a situation in which the remit of Herman Van Rompuy, the permanent president of the European Council (previously, as we know, the summits were presided over by the heads of state and government themselves on a rotating basis), can overlap with the remit of the Commission (see this column yesterday). Most of the institutional transformations resulting from this treaty are positive, notably the significant strengthening of the European Parliament's powers. Nonetheless, two aspects of it create difficulties: (a) the way in which the Commission's exclusive right of initiative operates in practice; (b) the triple status of the person responsible for external relations. In principle, neither Mr Barroso nor Ms Ashton is personally responsible for these difficulties. They are due to the new mechanisms creating unexpected repercussions.
Unforeseeable consequences? On the first aspect, Mr Van Rompuy's orientation described yesterday, with his operational examples, involves a risk of overlapping between his competences and those exercised by the Commission. To my knowledge, José Manuel Barroso has not responded to the president of the summit's text. During his first mandate, he explained that he thought it useful, overall, to obtain opinions from the member states before presenting any significant proposals. It was impossible to take into consideration all the different wishes but ultimately it was up to him to make these choices himself. During the current mandate, he appears to have taken a more authoritarian line but the overlapping resulting from the explicit position outlined by Mr Van Rompuy still persists. Should this overlapping be considered as a deliberate attempt to stretch out the balance of powers or should it be seen as the unforeseen consequences of the Lisbon Treaty? In its action, the Commission has on several occasions demonstrated its tough stance with regard to behaviour displayed by member states, which it considers as failing to comply with the letter and spirit of the treaty. I am not referring to legal differences on the texts of application, which provoke many infringement procedures and quite often end up at the European Court of Justice. I am, rather, referring to political divergences that sometimes provoke real conflicts, some of which have been reported at length in the press. One of these examples includes the firm line adopted by Viviane Reding on the question of the Roma or examination of the Hungarian law on the media.
Within the Commission. If we accept, which I do, that the Lisbon Treaty is partly responsible for this overlapping remit between the staff of Mr Barroso and Mr Van Rompuy, it may be useful to see how this situation unfolded at the Commission this week. To my knowledge, the most explicit position taken was that of Karel De Gucht, the European commissioner for trade (interview to “Le Soir” newspaper). He considers that the mechanism is quite clear: the European Council defines the orientations that the Commission transforms into legal texts (the Commission has exclusive remit to do this), which are then debated by the Council and Parliament, with the Commission acting as arbitrator. The Parliament very often supports the position put forward by the Commission! In his opinion, “there is much more power here than in a national government… I am free to discuss policy in general, including Belgian policy, provided I say that I'm doing this in a personal capacity… In this respect I feel very much at ease.”
Irrational and unfeasible. The role of Ms Ashton, in my opinion, is clearly irrational. Very often, the press defines this role as the European minister for foreign affairs, which is not true. Her task consists of preparing (together with the very extensive diplomatic service at her disposal, which is continuing to expand) the EU's positions and making a number of declarations. Given that at the same time she is vice-president of the European Commission, this produces something that is both politically and legally fictitious. It is in fact practically impossible to participate in the work of the Commission and she would not, in any case, know how to position herself in this structure. MEPs have said this is a case of “miscasting”. This is possible but I believe that the error is, above all, conceptual. Even if she were a diplomatic magician, she would not be able to play the triple role bestowed upon her. Being the vice-president of the Commission and head of a cumbersome diplomatic service that is difficult to manage in itself is an irrational and bad case of mismatching: this anomaly can be located in the treaty itself.
Only one remedy exists. If my analysis is essentially correct, the two shortcomings in the Lisbon Treaty do not result from the behaviour of the institutions but from the texts. Reasonable and pragmatic behaviour from the figures involved is the only remedy that exists if conflicts are to be avoided. (F.R./transl.fl)