The Commission derives its legitimacy from the European Parliament, not the governments. It is not legitimate unless all member states are represented within it at the same time, which they themselves agreed to when they signed the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon. It would be more legitimate if its composition adequately reflected populations or groups of populations. This proposal, never previously explored, consists first of all identifying population zones within the European Union, then rethinking the principle of rotation. Disciplines of cartography and statistics will be of enormous assistance here.
Germany has a population of 83,358,000, France 68,070,000 and Italy 58,850,000. These are the three most highly populated countries of the EU. Taken together, they represent 211,278,000 Europeans out of the total of 448,400,000 of which the EU is currently made up, or a very considerable 47%. They spread from the North to the South and from the West to the East of the Union, in itself constitutes a geographical balance. All three are founder members of the EU, of undisputed loyalty and members of the Eurozone. You can see the problem of the legitimacy in a Commission in which these populations were not fully represented – or even partially.
In view of these facts, it is entirely reasonable to exclude these three countries from the five-year rotation of the responsibilities of European Commissioner. In other words, the permanency of their representation is based on two objective criteria taken together: firstly, having a population of at least 55 million and secondly, being a founder State (this would become particularly important in the eventuality of the accession of Turkey, which is home to at 84 million souls).
This, then, defines the first three demographic zones, which we might call the ‘invariable tripod’: for zone 1 (Germany), zone 2 (France) and zone 3 (Italy), there would be one Commissioner each, no more and no fewer.
The remaining 12 zones would come under a different regime, common to all of them. They would be put into pairs of populations. Within each of these zones, a rotation would apply, from one term of office to the next, to the position of Commissioner, in accordance with the alphabetical order of two states. Let us start in the south-west and follow the map of Europe round clockwise.
Zone 4, Iberia, is made up of 40,059,000 Spaniards and 10,467,000 Portuguese citizens (total: 58,526,000). In zone 5, known as ‘Centre-West’, live 11,754,000 Belgians and 660,000 Luxembourgers (total: 12,414,000). Zone 6 (North-West) is home to 17,811,000 Dutch and 5,194,000 Irish (total: 23,005,000). 5,932,000 Danes and 10,521,000 Swedes (total 16,453,000) live in zone 7. Zone 8 (North-East) has 5,564,000 Finns and 1,366,000 Estonians (total: 6,930,000). Zone 9 (East) brings together 1,883,000 Latvians and 2,857,000 Lithuanians in partnership (total: 4,740,000).
Zone 10, the ‘Centre-East’, is made up of 36,753,000 Poles and 10,827,000 Czechs (total: 47,580,000). 5,428,000 Slovakians and 9,000,597 Hungarians (total: 15,025,000) live in zone 11. Let us move down to zone 12 (Centre-South I), which ‘marries’ 9,104,000 Austrians and 2,116,000 Slovenians (total: 11,220,000). Then, in zone 13 (Centre-South II), we count 3,850,000 Croatians and 19,051,000 Romanians (total: 22,901,000). In zone 14, ‘South-East’, there live 6,447,000 Bulgarians and 10,394,000 Greeks (total: 16,841,000). We end our journey in zone 15 (South), which is made up of 920,000 Cypriots and 542,000 Maltese (total: 1,460,000).
The alternation in each zone must be perfectly fair, in accordance with the principle of a full five-year mandate devolved upon one and then the other. Of the group of 12, the ‘South-West’ zone has the highest population, thanks to the demographic weight of Spain; it would therefore be entitled to request compensation in the form of a senior post in a different institution prior to a Portuguese Commissioner taking up office (chairmanship of the ECB or of the European Council, for instance).
Why could this scheme not partner up to geographically distant countries? Simply because we tend to know the most about our nearest neighbours’ concerns. This means, for instance, that if called upon to do so, a Greek Commissioner is better equipped to talk knowledgeably about the situation in Bulgaria than in Denmark.
For zones 4 to 15 combined, the total population stands at 237,097,000 and the average representation of the individual zones is nearly 20 million (19,758,000, to be precise). This average rises to over 70 million in the ‘tripod’ (zones 1 to 3). This means that the numerically small populations remain over-represented in the new system, but this over-representation is much fairer and less outrageous than the system of one Commission per member state. Within each zone, obviously, the member state whose turn it is has complete freedom to present its own candidate to be President of the Commission, preferably following consultation with the other country in the pairing, whose population the Commissioner will be representing for a period of five years.
Fifteen zones, giving a Commission reduced to 15 members: a proper team, more coherent, less of a drain on the administrative budget and, more importantly, ready for any future waves of enlargement. If the same rule is applied to any new member states, say if there are six of them, this would give a Commission of 18, thereby restricting its growth potential. It would be prudent to ensure that any such enlargements take effect to coincide with the start of a five-year mandate.
All these provisions could be set out in a new amending treaty. It goes without saying that this new system would not in any way change the way in which the President of the Commission is appointed; as everybody knows, this is done by a specific procedure and the pool of potential candidates remains the same. It would, furthermore, make no sense for this reform to lead to the emergence of a kind of ‘board of directors’ of the EU. The French, German or Italian Commissioners would have no additional rights, even the right to hold a vice-presidency. It will be the responsibility of the President of the institution to divide up the portfolios, on the basis of the equal treatment of all members of the College. Nor would the six-monthly rotation of the Presidency of the Council of the EU change at all.
The member states are equal within the European Council and in their representation at the Council. But let us look at the reality of the situation: they cease to be equal when the demographic parameter is taken into account, either for the composition of the European Parliament or the use of qualified-majority voting at the Council. The demographic dimension, which is an objective criterion, should now be taken into account by the Commission as well, as it is the institution responsible for the general interest, while making sure that the smaller players are not humiliated.
In conclusion, we have the opportunity to reflect upon a new system which is imaginative and well balanced, to rule out the possibility in the future of super-sized, obese and hyper-hierarchical Commissions, full of impractically slender portfolios, infighting and far too much time wasted in far too many internal coordinations. Continuing on the current trajectory would squander all the remaining credit of an institution that is already a figure of fun to many. If anyone can think of a better way to achieve the same goal, I am all ears.
Renaud Denuit